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REAL ESTATE SALES AND THE NEW IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF LAWFUL USE
Eric T. Freyfogle*
Real estate parcels are often subject to zoning ordinances,
building codes, occupancy rules, restrictive covenants and servi-
tudes, and other limitations on the owner's rights to use the prop-
erty.' These various land use restraints, alone or in combination,
can considerably restrict the uses of particular land parcels. The
enforcement of land use restraints, however, is often haphazard.
Municipalities usually do not check a property for ordinance and
code violations unless someone files a complaint or requests an in-
spection.2 Private beneficiaries under covenants, servitudes, and
easements often forgo enforcement of their rights, whether out of
ignorance of their rights, ignorance of violations, insufficient eco-
nomic motivation, or some desire to maintain good relations with
the violating landowners. With enforcement so inconsistent, land
use violations can for years remain uncorrected and even
undetected.
As a consequence of inconsistent enforcement, landowners
often attempt to sell real estate that violates applicable land use re-
straints. Material violations will be of considerable interest to pro-
spective buyers, especially if the buyer intends to continue the
seller's land use practices. Yet, a prospective buyer is unlikely to
learn of existing violations unless he makes appropriate inquiries or
seeks contractual assurances from the seller that existing uses com-
ply with applicable restraints. The caveat emptor doctrine, despite
strong recent criticism, 3 remains the rule governing unlawful land
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1973, Lehigh University;
J.D. 1976, University of Michigan.
For valuable criticisms and suggestions on earlier drafts I would like to thank my
colleagues Steve Harris, Deborah Merritt, Don Dripps, Michael Hoeflich, Roger Findley,
and Elaine Shoben. I would also like to thank Robin Dieckmann, a member of the Uni-
versity of Illinois College of Law Class of 1986, for her very able and diligent research
assistance.
I See, e.g., D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
§§ 54-89, 152-157, 163-172 (1971) (discussing zoning, building, and housing codes and
private restrictions).
2 See id. §§ 156-57; C. FIELD & S. RIVMiN, THE BUILDING CODE BURDEN 45-56
(1975) (considering structural and financial problems in building code compliance of-
fices that limit enforcement efficiency).
3 For a recent judicial discussion of conflicting views on caveat emptor in the con-
text of real estate sales, see Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 614-16 (Alaska 1980).
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usages: the buyer has the responsibility for determining whether
existing land uses are unlawful by inspecting the property, review-
ing municipal ordinances, and checking the seller's title.4 In most
states the seller is not obliged to disclose violations, however mate-
rial or latent, and makes no implied warranties or representations
that the buyer may lawfully continue existing land use practices. 5
For the unsuspecting buyer, the consequences of caveat emptor can
be severe.
6
Common law doctrines long have offered some relief to unsus-
pecting buyers of real estate not conforming to land use restraints.
That relief, however, has been limited in scope, and courts have
often denied relief to many buyers with severely disappointed ex-
pectations. For example, express representations of lawful use by
Some courts still cite the doctrine favorably. See, e.g., Oates v. JAG, Inc., 66 N.C. App.
244, 248, 311 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1984) (" 'Although the doctrine of caveat emptor, so far as
personal property is concerned, is very nearly abolished, it still remains as a viable doc-
trine in full force in the law of real estate.' ") (quoting Levy v. Young Constr. Co., 46
NJ. Super. 293, 296, 134 A.2d 717, 719 (App. Div. 1957), af'd, 26 NJ. 330, 139 A.2d
738 (1958)), rev'd, 333 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1985). The best current discussion of the doc-
trine as applied to real estate sales is M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF
REAL PROPERTY § 1.2(n) (4th ed. 1984).
For a historical review of the development of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The An-
dent Maxim of Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133 (1931). Numerous commentators have
questioned the doctrine of caveat emptor; many commentators writing recently have
focused on the implied warranty of habitability. Four of the best works are Bearman,
Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty---Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961);
Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. LJ. 633
(1965); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1953); and Seavey,
Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEx. L. REV. 439 (1960). A good recent survey of the grad-
ual, continuing decline of caveat emptor in real property law is Note, When the Walls Come
Tumbling Down-Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing, 56 ST.JOHN's L. REV. 670, 682-93
(1982).
4 See infra notes 42-85 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Denton v. Hood, 122 Ill. App. 3d 813, 461 N.E.2d 1069 (1984) (af-
firming judgment for seller of real estate because record failed to disclose any express
representations concerning legality of possible land uses or any intentional concealment
of existing violations); see infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
broadening of concept of misrepresentation) and notes 93-102 and accompanying text
(presenting cases imposing affirmative duties on sellers to disclose violations).
6 Three recent decisions illustrate the harsh effects of caveat emptor in Illinois, a
jurisdiction that follows the doctrine with some rigor. City of Aurora v. Green, 126 111.
App. 3d 684, 467 N.E.2d 610 (1984) (buyer of five unit apartment building expressly
described by seller as complying with zoning ordinances has no recourse when zoning
ordinance limits building to two units); Denton v. Hood, 122 Ill. App. 3d 813, 461
N.E.2d 1069 (1984) (no recourse for buyer of property with garage that seller knows is
in violation of zoning ordinance); O'Brien v. Noble, 106 Ill. App. 3d 126, 435 N.E.2d
554 (1982) (no recourse for buyer of five acre lot sold as site for construction of home
when zoning prohibits all construction). See also Lenzi v. Morkin, 103 Ill. 2d 290, 292,
469 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1984) (seller has no duty to disclose to buyer large increase in
assessed value of property). Compare Kinsey v. Scott, 124 Ill. App. 3d 329, 463 N.E.2d
1359 (1984) (buyer able to recover in misrepresentation after purchasing apartment
building with one unit constructed in violation of building code).
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sellers have sometimes resulted in liability for misrepresentation.
Yet, courts have often denied misrepresentation relief, typically on
the ground that the representation is one of law and therefore not a
proper subject for a misrepresentation action,7 or on the ground
that the buyer should have detected the seller's misrepresentation
through a diligent inspection of public records.8 Sympathetic courts
have occasionally granted rescission or restitution based on mutual
mistake or unjust enrichment, but many courts consider the risk of
illegal use foreseeable and place that risk on the buyer.9 Buyers can
most readily obtain relief if the illegal use renders the seller's title
unmarketable. Many illegalities, however, do not affect title market-
ability, 10 and relief for unmarketable title is available only if the ille-
gal use is identified before the sale closes and if the seller has not
followed the common practice of contractually limiting his obliga-
7 See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
9 E.g., Luciani v. Bestor, 106 Ill. App. 3d 878, 882,436 N.E.2d 251, 255 (1982) (no
rescission where status quo ante cannot be restored); Lawton v. Dracousis, 14 Mass.
App. 164, 172-73, 437 N.E.2d 543, 548 (1982) (purchaser assumed risk of mistake con-
cerning building code volations); Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich.
17, 32, 331 N.W.2d 203, 210-11 (1982) (contract clause providing that buyers agreed to
accept property "in its present condition" operated to allocate risk of loss to buyers);
DiDonato v. Reliance Standard. Life Ins. Co., 433 Pa. 221, 224, 249 A.2d 327, 329
(1969) (purchaser of real estate bears risk of zoning ordinance changes occurring after
execution of sales agreement but prior to conveyance). See infra notes 113-17 and ac-
companying text.
10 See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, §§ 3.5 to 3.8; R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
WHrrIMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.12, at 686-94 (1984) [hereinafter cited as THE
LAW OF PROPERTY]. As a general rule, violations of building codes and housing occu-
pancy rules do not render title unmarketable. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 3.6, at 246-
51; THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, § 10.12, at 694. Courts are split as to whether zoning
ordinance violations render title unmarketable, with perhaps a majority now concluding
that they do, at least if the violation is material and if it arises from a structure on the
land rather than some use of the land. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 3.8, at 260-65; THE
LAw OF PROPERTY, supra, § 10.12, at 694; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 362 (1971). See, e.g., Sta-
ley v. Stephens, 404 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (violation of building lot
setback requirement renders title unmarketable); Marathon Builders, Inc. v. Polinger,
263 Md. 410, 418, 283 A.2d 617, 622 (1971) (zoning density requirement that prohibits
all construction is not encumbrance). Covenants and easements are encumbrances that
will almost always render title unmarketable, even if not violated, unless the buyer has
expressly or implicitly agreed to take the property subject to them. See M. FRIEDMAN
supra note 3, §§ 4.9, 4.13(d); THE LAw OF PROPERTY, supra, § 10.12, at 693. A restrictive
covenant renders title unmarketable even though it substantially duplicates a particular
zoning or building use restraint which itself does not affect marketability. See, e.g.,
Coons v. Carstensen, 15 Mass. App. 431, 446 N.E.2d 114 (1983). Recent decisions pro-
vide some indication that courts are beginning to relax marketable title rules to increase
title marketability when a defect does not actually affect the use and enjoyment of a
parcel. See, e.g., Mucci v. Brockton Bocce Club, Inc., 19 Mass. App. 155, 159, 472 N.E.2d
966, 969 (1985) (minor encroachment of structure off property does not render title
unmarketable because encroachment would not cause prudent person to hesitate before
investing).
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tion to convey marketable title."I
This Article considers the remedies available to buyers of prop-
erty that is used contrary to land use restraints. It first examines the
growing tendency of courts to broaden the liability of sellers for
misrepresentation by weakening or eliminating elements of the mis-
representation action and by construing various actions of sellers as
implied, actionable representations that current land uses are law-
ful. These changes in the longstanding elements of misrepresenta-
tion law, it is asserted, are appropriate in this particular setting
because traditional misrepresentation law poorly reconciles the con-
flicting interests of buyers and sellers. This Article also discusses the
availability of rescission and restitution for disappointed buyers and
the increasing tendency of courts to require sellers and brokers to
disclose land use violations and other matters materially affecting
the value of the property.
These erosions of the caveat emptor doctrine reflect a growing
judicial willingness to protect real estate purchasers who assume
they can continue existing land uses and can rely on seller assertions
that particular land uses are permissible. Tort-based theories of re-
covery, however, are ill-suited to provide full relief for buyers and
fail to accommodate fairly the conflicting interests of real estate buy-
ers and sellers. An approach that better accommodates these con-
flicting interests-an approach that courts may soon employ as they
further increase protections for buyers-is the creation of a new
lawful use warranty that would be implied in all real estate contracts.
Under this approach, a seller would implicitly warrant that existing
uses of a parcel and any other uses described by the seller comply
with applicable land use restraints. This Article discusses the bene-
fits of this new implied warranty and considers the major issues that
a court or legislature will face in developing and refining it.
11 The seller's obligation to convey marketable tide lasts only until deed delivery;
thereafter, as a result of the doctrine of merger, the buyer must rely for relief on tide
covenants, if any. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 7.2, at 781-84; THE LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 10, § 10.12, at 695-98. Sellers commonly limit their obligation to convey
marketable title by contract clauses that obligate the purchaser to accept title subject to
specified or generally described restrictions and encumbrances. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 3, §§ 3.6 to 3.7, at 251-60, § 4.13(d), at 53944, § 4.13(b)(3). As a general rule,
such clauses do not cover violations of land use restraints, and buyers can still complain
of unmarketable title even if they have agreed to such clauses. See, e.g., Madhavan v.
Sucher, 105 Mich. App. 284, 306 N.W.2d 481 (1981); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3,
§ 4.13(d), at 541-43; THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 10.12, at 690. If the buyer
accepts the deed without knowledge of a land use illegality, he can sue only on title
covenants. Violations of building, housing, or similar municipal codes do not violate
title covenants; courts have only occasionally viewed zoning violations as encumbrances
under covenants against encumbrances. See, e.g, Monti v. Tangora, 99 Ill. App. 3d 575,
581-82,425 N.E.2d 597, 602-03 (1981) (building code violation not encumbrance); THE
LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 11.13, at 813.
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A new implied warranty of lawful use, similar in operation to
warranties of title 12 and the implied warranty of habitability, 13
would markedly improve upon existing tort-based approaches to the
problem of land use illegalities. The implied warranty of lawful use
would better protect the legitimate expectations of buyers, would
greatly simplify the factual disputes in litigation, and would provide
greater commercial certainty and flexibility for sellers by defining
.more precisely their responsibilities to buyers. Moreover, the im-
plied warranty would restore contract law as the framework of
seller-buyer dispute resolution. This restoration seems desirable,
for contract law better resolves disagreements between buyers and
sellers concerning the characteristics and qualities of property than
does tort law.
Before considering this new implied warranty, this Article ex-
amines in detail the ongoing transformation of misrepresentation
law. In the course of this examination, the Article considers some of
the realities of the real estate market and explains why sellers should
be obligated, whether in tort or in contract, to warrant absolutely
that existing land uses are lawful except as otherwise disclosed.
I
MISSTATEMENTS OF LAWFUL USE AND THE ONGOING
TRANSFORMATION OF MISREPRESENTATION LAW
Sellers misstating the legality of an existing or proposed use of
their real estate traditionally have enjoyed immunity from liability
for their assertions. Express oral statements by sellers did not con-
stitute contract warranties because of the parol evidence rule, 14 the
statute of frauds, and the doctrine of merger. 15 Such seller state-
12 On covenants of title in deeds, see THE LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 11.13.
13 For discussions of the recently developed warranty of habitability, see Haskell,
supra note 3; Knappenberger, Extension of Implied Warranties to Developer-Vendors of Com-
pleted New Homes, 11 URB. L. ANN. 257 (1976); Mallor, Extension of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability to Purchasers of Used Homes, 20 AM. Bus. LJ. 361 (1982); Shedd, The Implied
Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST. LJ. 291 (1980);
Note, Implied Warranties in New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defenseless?, 35 S.C.L. REv. 469
(1984).
14 Professor Corbin provides the following definition of the parol evidence rule:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate
integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of an-
tecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the
purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 573 (1963).
15 The statute of frauds and the doctrine of merger (by which all of the seller's
obligations are merged into the deed and cannot serve as a basis for liability imposed on
the seller when the deed has been delivered) also restrict the creation of warranties. See
D. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTIONER 228-35 (1981); Metzger, The Parol Evi-
dence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1383, 1391-1403 (1983);
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ments also failed to give rise to tort liability under the established
elements of misrepresentation law. Misrepresentation liability tradi-
tionally arose only if the injured plaintiff could show: (1) a false
statement of fact by the defendant, (2) the defendant's knowledge
that the statement was false (or some equivalent scienter), (3) an
intent to induce reliance by the plaintiff, and (4) actual, justifiable
reliance causing damage to the plaintiff. 16 When rigorously applied,
these traditional misrepresentation elements operated to deny re-
covery to nearly all injured buyers.
Deceived buyers seeking relief in misrepresentation have long
faced a particularly difficult hurdle in proving the existence of a false
statement of fact, particularly in states that adhere to the require-
ment in its original, technical form. Courts applying the require-
ment distinguish statements of law from statements of fact and
impose liability for misrepresentation on sellers only for factual mis-
statements. 17 For example, assertions about the zoning status of
property,' the permissibility of some existing or proposed use
under a zoning ordinance, 19 a building's compliance with building
codes, 20 the consistency of some specified use with a local develop-
ment standard, 21 and the need to obtain a permit before engaging
in a particular activity22 have all been viewed by courts as opinions
of law that cannot give rise to tort liability, no matter how express
and how effective in inducing detrimental reliance.
Bearman, supra note 3, at 548-50; Note, supra note 3, at 682-87. Although these com-
mentators indicate that the limitations on oral warranties are regularly criticized, the
limitations remain alive in somejurisdictions. See, e.g., Reimer v. Leshtz, 90 Ill. App. 3d
980, 982-83, 414 N.E.2d 114, 115-16 (1980) (discussing doctrine of merger and parol
evidence rule) (dictum); Rouse v. Brooks, 66 Ill. App. 3d 107, 111, 383 N.E.2d 666, 668-
69 (1978) (in contract action, parol evidence rule barred claim for breach of oral war-
ranty of quality in real estate sale absent allegations of fraud or mistake).
16 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]. Some courts discuss justifi-
able reliance and actual damage as separate elements in a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation. See, e.g., Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 282, 286, 402
N.E.2d 599, 601 (1980).
17 E.g., Northernaire Prods., Inc. v. County of Crow Wing, 309 Minn. 386, 389, 244
N.W.2d 279, 281-82 (1976) (misrepresentations of law only actionable if defendant,
learned in field, took advantage of the "solicited" confidence of plaintiff or if defendant
and plaintiff stand in fiduciary relationship). See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra
note 16, § 109, at 758-59; Cavico, Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Law--Are the Exceptions
Swallowing the General Rule?, 11 N. Ky. L. REv. 19, 19-23 (1984); James & Gray, Misrepre-
sentation-Part II, 37 MD. L. REv. 488, 494 (1978).
18 Davis v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 165 Ga. App. 96, 299 S.E.2d 186 (1983).
19 City of Aurora v. Green, 126 Ill. App. 3d 684, 467 N.E.2d 610 (1984); Gatz v.
Frank M. Langenfeld & Sons Constr., Inc., 356 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 1984).
20 Scott v. Wilson, 15 Ill. App. 2d 456, 146 N.E.2d 297 (1958).
21 O'Brien v. Noble, 106 II1. App. 3d 126, 435 N.E.2d 554 (1982).
22 Northernaire Prods., Inc. v. County of Crow Wing, 309 Minn. 386, 244 N.W.2d
279 (1976).
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Actions by buyers not floundering on the law-fact distinction
have often failed because a buyer's reliance on a seller's statement
of lawful use is considered unjustified by many courts when the
buyer through diligent action could have determined the state-
ment's truth. 23 Thus, a buyer in many states cannot rely on a repre-
sentation of zoning status or housing occupancy code compliance
but must instead independently check municipal ordinances and de-
termine a land parcel's compliance through an actual physical in-
spection.24  Other buyer misrepresentation claims have failed
because of insufficient evidence that the misstating seller knew of
the illegal use or otherwise acted with the requisite scienter,25 and
because the buyer failed to prove that the seller's misrepresentation
influenced his conduct directly and definitely enough to satisfy the
requirement of actual reliance.
26
Recently, courts in many jurisdictions have reassessed the mer-
its of caveat emptor and have undertaken to provide substantially
greater relief to injured buyers. Courts have granted this relief, not
by altering traditional limits on contract-based recovery, but rather
by radically reducing or eliminating most of the traditional hurdles
for recovery under a misrepresentation theory. These courts have
made recovery for buyers easier by interpreting sellers' representa-
tions of lawful use as statements of fact rather than law and by les-
sening buyers' obligations to check records and make other
inquiries into the truth of the representations. Some courts have
further aided injured buyers by concluding that sellers make im-
plied, actionable representations that existing land uses are lawful
by simply offering property for sale or" describing its particular uses.
These changes have nearly eliminated the required showing of fault
and have greatly diminished the requirement that buyers presume
seller dishonesty. In some states, this shift has been so radical as to
transform the essence of the action from one designed simply to
proscribe extreme malfeasance by sellers to one that, devoid of ele-
ments of fault, serves to protect a buyer's normal expectations about
the quality of the property he is buying. The tort action, in short,
has dropped its traditional fault-based background in some states
and now resembles a rule defining the minimum standards of mer-
chantable real estate.
With these alterations misrepresentation law can offer consider-
able protection for normal buyer expectations and can add fairness
23 E.g., City of Aurora v. Green, 126 Il. App. 3d 684, 689, 467 N.E.2d 610, 614
(1984); infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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and efficiency to the land sale process. Yet, as discussed in this sec-
tion, misrepresentation law can reconcile conflicting buyer-seller in-
terests and can provide relief for all deserving buyers only if
eviscerated of all of its elements and stripped of its focus on seller
fault. This alteration transforms misrepresentation law from a tradi-
tional tort format into something very much like an implied seller
warranty. Courts would do better to cease using misrepresentation
law as the chief vehicle for providing relief and instead use a con-
tract-based implied warranty action, a formal approach more useful
for setting a standard for the presumed quality of all real estate of-
fered for sale.
A. The Shifting Line Between Law and Fact
The long-established law-fact distinction in misrepresentation
law is still applied rigorously by some jurisdictions; many other ju-
risdictions apply the distinction in weakened form. The distinction
today is often criticized as artificial27 and, to an increasing extent, is
subject to exceptions and reformulations that transform nonaction-
able statements of law into actionable statements of fact. This de-
cline in the law-fact distinction 28 reflects a developing judicial
consensus that reliance on legal assertions, even assertions made by
adversaries, may at times be reasonable and deserving of legal
protection.
Two early exceptions to the law-fact distinction were the so-
called confidential-relationship and superior-knowledge exceptions.
These exceptions provided relief when the parties stood in some
relationship of trust or confidence 29 and when the speaker pos-
27 Courts have justified invoking the law-fact distinction on the ground that a legal
assertion is always a statement of opinion because no person, at least without special
training, can be presumed to know the law. Another justification offered is that every
person is presumed to know the law, which means that a representee cannot be deceived
by an erroneous legal statement. Commentators have forcefully criticized such justifica-
tions as being factually inaccurate and manifestly inconsistent. See PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 109, at 759; Cavico, supra note 17, at 21-24. But see Hamming
v. Murphy, 83 Ill. App. 2d 1130, 1135, 404 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (1980) ("[O]ne is not
entitled to rely upon a representation of law as both parties are presumed to be equally
capable of knowing and interpreting the law.") (citations omitted). Courts have sug-
gested additionaljustifications. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Noble, 106 Ill. App. 3d 126, 130, 435
N.E.2d 554, 557 (1982) (sellers have no duty to disclose legal restrictions on develop-
ment because such statements would constitute unauthorized 'practice of law and "[n]o
duty can arise out of a prohibited act").
28 Many courts have expressly or implicitly rejected the law-fact distinction in the
context of land use legality disputes. E.g., Carroll v. Gava, 98 Cal. App. 3d 892, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 778 (1979); Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d I (Del. 1982); Ortego v. Lebert, 406 So.
2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Benson v. White, 72 A.D.2d 627, 420 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1979);
Farnsworth v. Feller, 256 Or. 56, 471 P.2d 792 (1970).
29 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 109, at 760 (indicating that
members of same family, partners, attorney and client, executor and beneficiary of es-
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sessed or purported to possess knowledge of the legal matter that
was not available to the plaintiff.30 The superior-knowledge excep-
tion covered misstatements by attorneys as well as misstatements by
others who, by reason of training and experience, professed special
knowledge of the legal consequences of transactions in which they
regularly engaged.3 1 Some courts recently have undercut the law-
fact distinction more completely by concluding that legal assertions
can contain actionable implied assertions of fact.3 2 For example, a
landowner in form offers a legal conclusion when he states that he
possesses good title to a land parcel; his assertion, however, can im-
ply the presence of conveyances or other documents necessary to
vest title in him that are the basis of his legal conclusion.3 3 The
landowner's implied assertion that such documents exist can be
viewed as an assertion of fact distinct from the legal conclusion.3
4
As such, the implied assertion would furnish the grounds for a mis-
representation action.
Some courts have come close to rejecting the law-fact distinc-
tion entirely by concluding that legal assertions under some circum-
stances can reasonably be interpreted as assertions of fact and are
tate, principal and agent, insurer and insured, and close friends qualify as confidential
relationships); Cavico, supra note 17, at 25-26.
30 Dettler v. Santa Cruz, 403 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (buyer can
maintain action for fraud and deceit when seller failed to inform him of zoning violation
about which municipal authorities had repeatedly warned seller); Sawyer v. Pierce, 580
S.W.2d 117, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (sufficient evidence existed to conclude that
sellers knew of limitation on number of trailers on parcel of land and, concomitantly,
constraints on profitability of enterprise, but failed to inform buyers); PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 109, at 760-61; Cavico, supra note 17, at 26-29.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 comment d (1977). See also Nantell v.
Lim-Wick Constr. Co., 228 So. 2d 634, 637-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (complaint for
misrepresentation is sufficient when it alleges that broker misstated ease of obtaining
zoning change); Peterson v. Auvel, 275 Or. 633, 637-39, 552 P.2d 538, 540-41 (1976)
(complaint in misrepresentation action is sufficient when it alleges that broker knowingly
misstated binding effect of purchase money agreement).
32 E.g., Sorensen v. Gardner, 215 Or. 255, 261-62, 334 P.2d 471,474 (1959) (state-
ment that plumbing complies with building code contained implied factual assertion as
to existing plumbing). See Cavico, supra note 17, at 30-32; James & Gray, supra note 17,
at 494-95. Nonactionable statements of opinion can also contain implied assertions of
fact. E.g., Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 483, 489-90, 429 N.E.2d 1267,
1272-74 (1982) (upholding sufficiency of complaint alleging that real estate agents'
opinions concerning property's value contained implied assertion about its actual
value).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 comment c (1977); Cavico, supra note
17, at 31.
34 When a landowner's statement cannot be construed to contain an implied asser-
tion of a particular fact, it might nonetheless contain an implied assertion that the land-
owner knows no facts which would belie his legal conclusion, an implication that can be
viewed as factual in nature. See National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 23
N.Y.2d 621, 627-28, 246 N.E.2d 351, 355-56, 298 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504-05 (1969); PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 109, at 760-61; Cavico, supra note 17, at 30-
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therefore actionable.3 5 Courts have held, for example, that a state-
ment that property is located within a particular business zoning cat-
egory is a factual representation rather than a legal one when
phrased and presented as a definite assertion rather than an
opinion.
3 6
Despite these developments, some jurisdictions continue to ad-
here to the law-fact distinction.3 7 Its continued existence may well
be attributable to its value in directing attention to the complexity of
legal issues involved in land sales and the unreasonableness of rely-
ing on legal conclusions made by untrained people. Nevertheless,
reliance on legal assertions will seem reasonable in many situations
and should receive express legal protection. Some legal issues are
within the ken of ordinary sellers. Even with more complex issues,
nonlawyer-sellers might have obtained accurate legal knowledge
from lawyers, municipal inspectors or officials, or other authorita-
tive sources. Thus, for example, a buyer might reasonably assume
that a building owner knows the zoning status of his property,
knows that the present use does not violate the terms of easements
or covenants of record, or knows whether his building complies with
municipal codes.38 When the legal issue is one like these that di-
35 See Growther v. Guidone, 183 Conn. 464, 468, 441 A.2d 11, 13 (1981) ("To
require the representation to be made as a statement of fact. . . is quite different than
to require that the statement be factual as opposed to legal. The former requirement
focuses on whether, under the circumstances surrounding the statement, the representa-
tion was intended and understood as one of fact as distinguished from one of opinion.")
(citations omitted); Gartner v. Eikell, 319 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn. 1982) (whether state-
ment was one of law or fact is irrelevant in equitable proceeding for rescission of con-
tract for sale of real estate because of mutual mistake concerning zoning); Gardner
Homes, Inc. v. Gaither, 31 N.C. App. 118, 120, 228 S.E.2d 525, 526, cert. denied, 291
N.C. 323, 230 S.E.2d 675 (1976) (where both parties to real estate contract believed that
property was zoned for commercial use, mutual mistake of fact justified rescission).
36 E.g., Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 544 P.2d 694 (1976); National Conver-
sion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 621, 246 N.E.2d 351, 298 N.Y.S.2d 499
(1969).
37 See, e.g., Fields v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 349 F. Supp. 612, 615 (E.D. Ky. 1972);
Mahler v. Paquin, 142 Ga. App. 582, 585, 236 S.E.2d 512, 514, vacated on other grounds,
239 Ga. 645, 238 S.E.2d 692 (1977); Frederick v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 436 S.W.2d
765, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
38 On the reasonableness of a buyer's reliance on a seller's statements of lawful use,
see infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. Several courts have asserted that a seller
not only might know the legality of his land uses but, for purposes of misrepresentation
law, is presumed to know or has a duty to know. E.g., Birch v. Ciria, 205 Cal. App. 2d 1,
6, 22 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801 (1962) (no error in lower court finding that seller, who was
maintenance man, should have known that building permit was required for reconstruc-
tion); Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc., 155 Conn. 343, 346-47, 232 A.2d 307, 309
(1967) (seller, developer of residential real estate, should have known truth about com-
pliance with zoning ordinance minimum lot size requirements); Bradbury v. Rentz, No.
CA 7958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1984) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS, States li-
brary, Ohio file) (seller presumed to know of violation of building occupancy certificate).
Moreover, a seller at common law is obligated to convey marketable title, an obligation
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rectly and personally affects the seller, the seller's legal conclusion
seems much more reliable. Moreover, some legal issues - whether,
for example, particular electrical wiring comports with a building
code - involve the application of relatively clear legal rules to par-
ticular facts. A speaker's assertion in such a case reflects as much a
specialized knowledge of facts as it does an expert knowledge of law.
As the facts become more complex, buyers are increasingly likely to
forego investigation and buyer reliance again would seem more
reasonable. 39
A reasonable, careful buyer, in short, might rely on an assertion
about the zoning status or code compliance of a parcel as readily
and legitimately as he would rely on an assertion that a basement is
dry or a septic system fully operational. It is this basic conclusion
about the reasonableness of buyer reliance that has motivated many
courts to limit the once dominant law-fact differentiation. Of course,
legal assertions can be stated with varying degrees of definitiveness
ranging from mere conjecture to unqualified conclusion. Reliance
may well be unreasonable when a legal conclusion is expressed
clearly as an opinion or is otherwise couched in terms suggesting
caution or uncertainty.40 This limitation, however, also applies to
factual assertions, which become unreliable and nonactionable when
qualified or expressed as opinion.41 It can easily be retained as a
limitation on misrepresentation liability by a court that rejects the
law-fact distinction.
B. Inquiry Duties and the Redefinition of Reasonable
Buyer Conduct
Like the law-fact distinction, the traditional misrepresentation
command for diligent inquiries by buyers to uncover falsity on the
part of sellers has met growing judicial resistance. Yet, despite ef-
forts to weaken or abolish it, the command remains a stumbling
that presumes a seller knows the contents of his title and one that can subject a seller to
liability for unmarketable title or for breach of title covenants for some types of unlawful
land uses. See supra notes 10, 11.
39 See James & Gray, supra note 17, at 493 ("[A]s the implication of external facts
increases, so does the justification for reliance.").
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 170 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 545 comments a, d (1977); Cavico, supra note 17, at 33; James & Gray, supra
note 17, at 495-96. Compare Cooper v.Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr.
724, 727 (1976) (misrepresentation action lies for statement of opinion if speaker does
not honestly or cannot reasonably believe opinion).
41 See, e.g., Duhl v. Nash Realty Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 483, 489, 429 N.E.2d 1267,
1272 (1981) ("Statements as to the value of property, particularly statements made by
the seller, are often treated as mere expressions and if so intended and understood,
fraud may not be predicated thereon."). See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra note 16,
at 755-58.
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block for buyers in many jurisdictions. 42 The purpose of the origi-
nal rule requiring reasonable diligence was to discourage negli-
gence by buyers and to promote attention to self interests. The
requirement reflected the longstanding rule of commerce that a
contracting party cannot assume honesty on the part of those across
the table.43 It reflected as well a belief that a buyer who has ignored
easy checks on the accuracy of a statement by a seller presumably
considered the statement unimportant and therefore did not detri-
mentally rely on it. The rule thus served to distinguish cases of ac-
tual detrimental reliance from situations in which the buyer viewed
the seller's assertion as unimportant and, consequently, suffered no
injury from it.4
4
As courts increasingly have required good faith and minimal
fairness in commercial settings,45 they have reduced or abandoned
buyer inquiry duties in situations where such duties have operated
to sanction deceptive conduct by sellers. 46 Many courts have re-
42 E.g., Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1089, 1092
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (following "the oft-quoted, well-settled, broad generalization
that a person to whom false representations have been made is not entitled to relief
because of them if he might readily have ascertained the truth by ordinary care and
attention"); Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 87-89, 273 S.E.2d 910, 916-18 (1980)
(holding that purchaser did not exercise due diligence under Fair Business Practice Act,
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-390 to 10-1-426 (1982)); Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v.
Owens, 62 N.C. App. 695, 698, 303 S.E.2d 565, 568, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 321, 307
S.E.2d 164 (1983) ("Where ... the purchaser has full opportunity to make pertinent
inquiries but fails to do so through no artifice or inducement of the seller, an action in
fraud will not lie."); Citation Co. Realtors, Inc. v. Lyon, 610 P.2d 788, 791 (Okla. 1980)
(upholding trial court's granting of summary judgment motion against purchaser on
fraud claim because evidence indicated that purchaser had means of ascertaining truth
of seller's statement); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 108, at 750-53;
James & Gray, supra note 17, at 511-17.
43 E.g., Torres v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 438 So. 2d 757, 758-59 (Ala.
1983) (identifying policy underlying rule as discouraging buyers' negligence and inat-
tention to their own interests); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 108, at
751-52; James & Gray, supra note 17, at 514-15.
44 On the requirement that the seller's statement be sufficiently material to moti-
vate buyer conduct, see PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 108, at 753-54;
James & Gray, supra note 17, at 498-502.
45 An example of the judicially imposed requirement that contracting parties act in
good faith is Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984) (covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in all contracts). See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Com-
mon Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 404 (1980) (providing exten-
sive citation to cases expressly recognizing a general obligation of good faith
performance in every contract at common law).
46 In many recent decisions courts have not required real estate buyers to check
municipal ordinances, land title records, or other public records in order to show rea-
sonable reliance. This rejection of mandatory records-search duties now represents the
majority view. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property Located in the Borough of
Manhattan, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska
1980); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 544 P.2d 694 (1976); Norton v. Poplos, 443
A.2d I (Del. 1982); Chapman v. Hosek, 131 Ill. App. 3d 180, 187-88, 475 N.E.2d 593,
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quired checks by buyers only when the seller's statements seem
questionable or the buyer otherwise receives notice of possible inac-
curacies or falsities.47 Some courts have even abolished all inquiry
duties and now bar recovery only when a buyer's actions in failing to
uncover the truth seem " 'wholly irrational, preposterous, or in bad
faith.' "48 This approach is consistent with the law's general con-
demnation of dishonesty and bad faith. Given this general attitude
in the law today, duties of inquiry seem inappropriate when a buyer
can prove actual reliance and clear consequential injury.
Although on the wane in misrepresentation law generally, the
duty to investigate has retained some vigor in the real estate transfer
setting when a buyer could have uncovered the falsity of a seller's
assertion by checking public records. Thus, many courts still con-
sider reliance unreasonable when a buyer can check a statement's
accuracy by reviewing zoning maps, searching deeds and encum-
brances of record, or making inquiries of municipal code enforc-
ers. 49 A rationale for such rigid records-search duties is hard to
identify, and the rule requiring searches imposes a difficult and un-
reasonable burden on most real estate buyers. Searches of these
sources may appear to be easy in the eyes of judges and lawyers, 50
599 (1985); Ortego v. Lebert, 406 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Henderson v.
D'Annolfo, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 446 N.E.2d 103, cert. denied, 389 Mass. 1101, 448
N.E.2d 767 (1983); Gamel v. Lewis, 373 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Fox v. South-
ern Aippliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 141 S.E.2d 522 (1965); Asleson v. West Branch
Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981); Niehaus v. Haven Park W., Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d
24, 440 N.E.2d 584 (1981); Heverly v. Kirkendall, 257 Or. 232, 478 P.2d 381 (1970);
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983).
47 E.g., Shelton v. Wells, 28 Bankr. 218, 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983); Keeshin v.
Levin, 31 Ill. App. 3d 790, 796-97, 334 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1975); Fairmont Foods Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 616 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
48 Foster v. Cross, 650 P.2d 406, 411 (Alaska 1982) (quoting Cousineau v. Walker,
613 P.2d 608, 613 (Alaska 1980)). For cases rejecting mandatory buyer inquiry duties in
the context of real estate sales, see supra note 46.
49 E.g., Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1089, 1092
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding trial court's denial of purchaser's action for rescis-
sion when purchasers did not inspect zoning and building records prior to closing); City
of Aurora v. Green, 126 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688-89, 467 N.E.2d 610, 613 (1984) (uphold-
ing trial court's dismissal of misrepresentation action when plaintiff could have readily
made inquiries to municipal officials); Pakrul v. Barnes, 631 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981) (upholding trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s misrepresentation claim be-
cause, inter alia, plaintiffs failed to make inquiries of municipal officials despite "ample
opportunity" to do so); NRC, Inc. v. Pickhardt, 667 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)
(buyer has no right to rely on statement contrary to recorded title).
50 The longstanding popularity of the ruling in Flureau v. Thornhill, 96 Eng. Rep.
635 (C.P. 1776), reflects a judicial recognition that the title search process is a difficult
one. In Flureau, the court denied consequential damages to a buyer when the seller,
despite his good faith, was unable to deliver good title. The rule "may have stemmed
from the notion that English land titles of that day were so uncertain that it was unrea-
sonable to subject a vendor to substantial liability for his title's failure." THE LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 10.3, at 643. The rule lives on today in the many states that
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but such searches often will be difficult and mysterious to the buyer
unrepresented by legal counsel or brokers at the time of contract
execution. Buyers of desirable property often must move quickly to
make purchase offers and have little time before contract execution
to undertake records checks and property inspections. Moreover, a
buyer who makes an offer that he believes is unlikely to be accepted
may not reasonably be expected to engage in expensive inquiries.
Astute or well-counselled buyers often contract for warranties or
cancellation clauses protecting them against the risk of seller dis-
honesty, but untrained and unadvised buyers are unlikely to con-
sider such options. 5 1 When a seller induces buyer reliance by
making a false statement, it is unfair to protect him at the expense of
a buyer whose conduct is commercially reasonable in comparison to
other untrained buyers. A mandatory inquiry rule discourages neg-
ligence and inattention on behalf of those who know the rule but is
merely a costly trap for the many who are unaware of it.
One reason, perhaps, why many courts have clung to
mandatory inquiry rules in the context of real estate sales is that
buyers are deemed to have notice for certain purposes of all matters
within the record title of the property they are purchasing. Buyers
take property subject to easements, covenants, encumbrances,
leases, and other matters of record, whether or not they have actual
notice.52 Courts recognizing this notice rule might well apply it un-
thinkingly to preclude a buyer's reliance on a statement that contra-
dicts a publicly recorded title. This approach has superficial appeal.
For example, it does seem reasonable to assume that a buyer with
constructive record notice of a restrictive covenant should not be
able to claim reliance on the seller's contention that the property is
free of restrictions. Such an approach, however, fundamentally mis-
construes the rationale of constructive record notice and the policy
reasons supporting state recording statutes. Constructive notice
limit buyer recovery when a seller in good faith is unable to deliver marketable title. Id.
§ 10.3, at 642-43 & n.12. See Report, Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Lawyer's
Proper Role-Services-Compensation, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 581, 587 (1979)
(tide examination "is generally the most important legal work" connected with property
sale).
51 Haskell, supra note 3, at 642 ("That [a] buyer should obtain an express warranty
for his protection assumes a degree of sophistication on the buyer's part which fre-
quently does not exist.").
52 At common law, buyers took only such title as the seller had to convey, which
meant that they took the seller's title subject to all outstanding interests held by third
parties. Recording acts alter this rule by giving priority to bona fide purchasers for value
who take the property without actual, record, or constructive notice of the interests
(pure notice approach), who take without notice and record first (race-notice approach),
or who simply record first (pure race approach). See THE LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note
10, § 11.9. Thus, buyers today in all jurisdictions take subject to third party interests
that are properly recorded.
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rules define the relative rights of buyers of property vis-a-vis third
party claimants in the same property. 53 Buyers with actual or con-
structive notice of interests of third parties take subject to such in-
terests; buyers lacking notice take free of them.54 Buyers and third
party claimants usually will have had no contact with one another,
and a reliable central records center is thus essential to advise each
of the rights of the other. Constructive notice rules and recording
statutes, however, have no bearing on the respective contractual
rights and duties of the buyer and seller. They are bound exclu-
sively by the terms of their agreement without regard to the terms
and limitations in any documents of record. As against the seller, a
buyer who executes a purchase contract is not presumed to know of,
much less to accept, the various limitations on the seller's title. 55
The seller's common law duty is to arrive at closing with marketable
title.56 The seller cannot claim that the buyer, by agreeing to
purchase the seller's property, has agreed to take it subject to en-
cumbrances or limitations of record unless the contract expressly so
provides.5
7
If a seller's assertion as to matters of record is definite in form
and apparently reliable, a buyer having no reason to suspect that the
assertion is false should be protected when he relies on it. By way of
analogy, no records check is required of buyers of personal prop-
erty. Car buyers, for example, can rely on a seller's representations
and need not investigate their accuracy by checking with some gov-
53 Several courts have held that a buyer with record notice of third-party interests
does not have actual notice so as to defeat a misrepresentation action against the seller,
even if the buyer has expressly agreed to take the property subject to all restrictions of
record. E.g., Fox v. Southern Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 269-73, 141 S.E.2d 522,
524-26 (1965) (reversing trial court's dismissal of claim alleging that seller misrepre-
sented that there were no restrictions on property even though property was subject to
covenants appearing in record title); Schoedel v. State Bank of Newburg, 245 Wis. 74,
75-77, 13 N.W.2d 534, 535-36 (1944) (upholding trial court's dismissal of defendant
seller's demurrer to misrepresentation action; defendants had claimed that at time they
allegedly misrepresented that they had first mortgage on property there was another
mortgage on record).
54 More precisely, under nearly all state recording acts, buyers without notice who
pay fair value for the property take free of unrecorded third party interests, although in
about half of the states (race-notice states) they must also record their deeds before the
third parties do. In the few pure race jurisdictions, buyers for value with notice take free
of unrecorded third party interests if they record first. See THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 10, §§ 11.9 to 11.10.
55 Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, the seller is obligated to deliver
marketable title, which is a title free of all restrictions and encumbrances. Id. § 10.12, at
687-89. Some courts recently have held that in normal real estate contracts buyers im-
plicitly agree to take property subject to encumbrances that are readily visible, actually
known to the purchaser, or beneficial to the land. Id. § 10.12, at 693.
56 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 4.2, at 318 ("In the absence of agreement other-
wise, a buyer is entitled to a 'marketable title.' ").
57 THE LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 10.12.
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ernmental body, with the manufacturer, or with purchasers of iden-
tical cars. 58 In sum, the rules of constructive record notice, valuable
in establishing buyer-third party rights, have no reasonable applica-
tion in defining the relative rights of buyers and sellers.
C. The Broadening Concept of Representation
The decline of the law-fact distinction and the increasing judi-
cial rejection of buyer inquiry duties have greatly expanded the cir-
cumstances in which a buyer can recover in misrepresentation for
false seller statements. Buyer recovery has been further aided by an-
other, potentially more significant development in misrepresenta-
tion law: the increasing tendency of courts to construe some seller
conduct as tantamount to a verbal representation of some fact, and
to interpret a verbal description of property as an implied represen-
tation of lawful use.59 For example, in several jurisdictions a seller
who advertises for sale a five unit apartment building has implicitly
represented that the buyer can rent all five units consistent with ap-
plicable land use restraints. 60 A seller who has publicized income
figures from income-providing property has implicitly represented
that the buyer can use the property for such income-producing ac-
tivities. 61 This broadened definition of an actionable representation
58 The seller's representations must become part of the "basis of the bargain" be-
tween the buyer and seller. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977). The Code section is silent con-
cerning any affirmative duties of the buyer to investigate. For discussions of what "the
basis of the bargain" locution means, see R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
SALES § 68 (1970); G. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 11.0612] (1981); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-2 to 9-4 (2d ed. 1980); 3 WILLISTON ON SALES § 17-5
(4th ed., A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, eds. 1974); infra notes 79-82 and accompanying
text.
59 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, at 736-37.
60 Kinsey v. Scott, 124 Ill. App. 3d 329, 336, 463 N.E.2d 1359, 1364 (1984). See
Iverson v. Solsbery, 641 P.2d 314, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (seller who unlawfully
converts space into extra apartment has duty to disclose illegality to purchaser because
such information "materially affects the desirability of the property"); Strickland v. Ves-
covi, 3 Conn. App. 10, 484 A.2d 460 (1984) (description of property as two family home
suggests that two family use would be lawful); Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 49,
247 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1969) (seller's advertisement of property as suitable for multi-
family use generates duty to disclose that such use would be unlawful); Dettler v. Santa
Cruz, 403 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (statement that dwelling consists of
three units that can be separately rented amounts to representation that such rental
would be lawful); Rowntree v. Rice, 426 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (seller,
by advertising and showing property as including swimming pool, implicitly represented
that entire pool is within property boundaries). But see Creelman v. Rogowski, 152
Conn. 382, 383-84, 207 A.2d 272, 274 (1965) (seller who advertised property as three-
unit apartment building when zoning ordinance limited building to two units made no
implied representation of lawful use). The current trend is toward the imposition of
greater duty toward buyers. See, e.g., Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa 1985);
Walter v. Moore, No. 83-183 (Wyo. May 23, 1985).
61 Sawyer v. Pierce, 580 S.W.2d 117, 124-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See Kannavos v.
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is similar to the older, well-established rule of misrepresentation law
that a speaker who makes a statement must state enough to avoid
misleading the listener.62 A seller who describes an apartment as
having five rental units misleads the listener, and therefore makes an
actionable misrepresentation, when he fails to add that one or more
of the units cannot lawfully be occupied.
63
This reasoning comports well with the normal expectations of
buyers and is a logical extension of misrepresentation principles,
When a seller advertises a tavern for sale, a prospective buyer might
logically assume that he can lawfully use the property as a tavern.6
Similarly, when a landowner sells his property in two parcels, a
buyer might reasonably assume that the property has been lawfully
partitioned.6 5 By dropping the need for an express seller statement,
this approach would significantly increase the frequency of seller
representations and thereby greatly broaden buyer recovery for un-
disclosed illegal land uses. Indeed, this approach would give rise to
seller representations of lawful use in virtually all cases because real
estate sellers always describe the property they are offering for sale,
whether in writing, orally, or by showing the property to prospective
buyers or their agents. Such descriptions convey implied assertions
of lawful use because they quite clearly suggest to the average buyer
that the buyer can lawfully use the property for the purposes
described or demonstrated. In short, this broadened concept of
misrepresentation serves the beneficial purpose of bringing misrep-
resentation law into compliance with normal buyer expectations.
D. Scienter, Reliance, and the Avoidance of Innocent Losses
Even under such a reformulated misrepresentation doctrine,
buyers can continue to encounter difficulties in obtaining relief. A
buyer still must prove that he actually relied on the seller's state-
ment66 and that the seller possessed the requisite scienter. Both of
Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 49, 247 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1969) (description of property as in-
come producing, together with income figures, gave rise to seller's duty to disclose that
such use would be unlawful).
62 See Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 48, 247 N.E.2d 708, 711 (1969) (no liabil-
ity for bare nondisclosure, but party who speaks "'is bound to speak honestly and to
divulge all the material facts bearing upon the point that lie within his knowledge' ")
(quoting F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 7.14 (1956)); PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 106, at 738-39. Kinsey v. Scott, 124 Ill. App. 3d 329,
336, 463 N.E.2d 1359, 1364 (1984).
63 See Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 5-6 (Del. 1982) (seller who advertised zoning
category of property misleads buyer if he does not add that restrictive covenants limit
many of the activities otherwise allowed in zoning category).
64 Bradbury v. Rentz, No. CA 7958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1984) (available Aug. 24,
1985, on LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
65 Ogan v. Ellison, 297 Or. 25, 682 P.2d 760 (1984).
66 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, §§ 107-109; James & Gray,
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these elements can prove troublesome. In proving actual reliance
buyers can encounter difficult factual issues of materiality, causa-
tion, and human motivation. To establish the latter element, seller
scienter, a buyer must show that the seller intended to deceive him
67
or, at the minimum, that the seller had reason to know that his rep-
resentation was false or that he lacked sufficient information to
know of its truth or falsity.68 A buyer will often find it difficult to
prove the state of a seller's mind, 69 especially if he did not have pro-
longed contact with the seller. Moreover, proof of scienter can add
time and expense to resulting litigation.
These traditional misrepresentation issues of seller intent and
actual buyer reliance are harmful and unneeded in the context of
land use legality disputes. A seller who knowingly deceives a buyer
on the legality of particular land uses clearly deserves little sympa-
thy or protection. Although less clear, there are good reasons why a
seller who unknowingly misleads a buyer on such a matter is no
Misrepresentation-Part 1, 37 MD. L. REv. 286, 296-322 (1977); James & Gray, supra note
17, at 488-502, 518-22.
67 Traditionally, a plaintiff seeking recovery under a misrepresentation theory had
to establish that the speaker intended to deceive the plaintiff; today, many courts impose
liability for negligent and even innocent misrepresentation. The imposition of liability
for an innocent misrepresentation makes the speaker strictly liable for his statements.
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, § 107;James & Gray, supra note 66, at
296-322.
68 For cases illustrating the range of legal standards, see, e.g., Carroll v. Gava, 98
Cal. App. 3d 892, 895-96, 159 Cal. Rptr. 778, 780 (1979) (seller liable for negligent
misrepresentation when he had no reasonable grounds to believe his statement that
property complied with zoning restrictions was true); Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d
860, 865-66, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726-27 (1976) (condominium sales agent liable for
statement of opinion that condo units were well built if he does not honestly or cannot
reasonably believe the opinion); Birch v. Ciria, 205 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5-6, 22 Cal. Rptr.
798, 801 (1962) (seller liable in misrepresentation because he knew building permit was
needed to add apartment); Wilson v. Hisey, 147 Cal. App. 2d 433, 438, 305 P.2d 686,
689-90 (1957) (broker liable for negligent misstatement unless he had reasonable
grounds to believe statement was true); Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc., 155 Conn.
343, 346, 232 A.2d 307, 309 (1967) (developer liable for unintentional misrepresenta-
tion of compliance with zoning restriction because he should have known of noncompli-
ance); Lively v. Garnick, 160 Ga. App. 591, 593, 287 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1981) (actual
seller knowledge required; essence of action is moral fault); Lawton v. Dracousis, 14
Mass. App. Ct. 164, 170-71, 437 N.E.2d 543, 547-48 (1982) (no liability for nondisclo-
sure of building code violations where seller lacks knowledge after reasonably investigat-
ing whether building complied with code); Bradbury v. Rentz, No. CA 7958 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 3, 1984) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (seller
liable for nondisclosure without any actual knowledge because he should have known of
zoning problem); Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309
(1980) (broker liable for unintentional misrepresentation because he failed "to take rea-
sonable steps to avoid disseminating . . . false information").
69 An example of the difficulty of proving seller intent is provided in Berger v. Li-
mon, 214 Cal. App. 2d 149, 29 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1963). In Berger, the appellate court
upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant seller did not receive notices of
building code violations despite evidence that the seller had been notified on two sepa-
rate occasions.
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more deserving of protection. The issue is a straightforward one:
As between a buyer and a seller, both unaware of the illegalities, on
whom should a loss fall?
The seller's superior knowledge provides one basis for favoring
the injured, innocent buyer over the innocent seller. The seller is
likely to know more about the property, its physical characteristics
and uses, and its compliance with land use restraints. 70 The seller
also will often possess property surveys and title abstracts and will
have greater time and opportunity to learn of the legality of existing
uses. Even if a seller must investigate whether his property com-
plies with the applicable regulations, his single study is more effi-
cient than requiring all potential buyers to repeat and thus
wastefully duplicate the inquiry. Moreover, sellers offering property
commonly have weeks or months to prepare to list their property.
Buyers, on the other hand, must often present offers quickly and are
frequently unfamiliar with local records, regulations, and
procedures.
A second basis for favoring the buyer lies with the difficulty of
discerning seller knowledge and intent. If innocent losses fall on
the buyer, sellers will be encouraged to disavow all knowledge of
illegal uses, and the buyer will be left with the difficult investigative
task of discerning what information was presented to or was within
the reasonable reach of the seller. When a seller has owned a parcel
for years, the buyer's investigative task might well be formidable and
might be compounded if the seller has departed the area after the
sale.
The workings of the typical real estate market and the desirabil-
ity of avoiding seller-buyer disputes in the first instance also argue
for imposing losses and inquiry duties on sellers. The aim of the law
in this area should be not simply fair loss allocation but the stimula-
tion of conduct that uncovers the land use illegalities and thereby
avoids the losses before contract execution. With their superior
knowledge and greater time to act, sellers are better able to perform
the needed inquiries. Sellers are also better positioned to make the
inquiries because they almost always have access to professional ad-
70 By presuming that sellers know certain matters concerning their property, some
courts have effectively imposed inquiry duties on them. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Rentz, No.
CA 7958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1984) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS, States li-
brary, Ohio file) (zoning compliance); Dugan v.Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)
(" 'An owner is presumed to know the boundaries of his own land, the quantity of his
acreage, and the amount of water available. If he does not know the correct informa-
tion, he must find out .... "') (quoting Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 715, 571
P.2d 769, 776 (1977)). Moreover, sellers at common law are obligated to convey mar-
ketable title; thus, when executing sale contracts, they are presumed to know whether
their title is marketable. See supra notes 10, 11, 50.
19851
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
vice on the need for the inquiries and how to perform them. Sellers
commonly 7' employ professional real estate brokers who possess
substantial knowledge of property law. 72 Buyers also use brokers,
but their brokers are usually paid by the sellers and, as a legal mat-
ter, owe buyers few, if any, fiduciary duties.73 Buyers, therefore,
cannot rely on their brokers to advise them fully on matters that
might undercut a sale and thereby harm the seller's interest.74 In
contrast, sellers benefit from counsel by professional brokers whose
own interests match their employers' interests. Finally, many buy-
ers, particularly those purchasing personal residential or small busi-
ness property, seek independent legal counsel only after they have
signed binding purchase contracts. 75 At the time of contract sign-
ing, buyers often have received little or no advice on the actions that
they should undertake before committing themselves to buy.
In imposing inquiry duties the law ideally should impose them
on parties who are likely to learn of them and be well-positioned to
fulfill them, thus promoting loss avoidance. Nonlawyers do not
know the law, and the imposition of some duty on a class of people
is unproductive if not unfair when the affected people do not know
of the duty. Judging from the considerable flow of reported deci-
sions, buyers today are not commonly aware of their obligation to
make lawful use inquiries and are not advised of their duties by their
71 See, e.g., Eskridge, One Hundred Years of lneptitude: The Needfor Mortgage Rules Conso-
nant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70
VA. L. REv. 1083, 1118-22 (1984); Report, supra note 50, at 585, 590-92.
72 See Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers in New Jersey: A Callfor
Compromise, 2 Rtrr.-CAm. L. REv. 322, 339-40 (1970) (arguing that real estate brokers
should be allowed to provide to clients some services which are now the province of
lawyers because of brokers' background in field, their study, and current regulation in-
suring their competence).
73 For a recent summary of the prevailing view that buyers' brokers are agents or
subagents of the sellers, with a discussion of recent decisions obligating brokers to deal
fairly with buyers, see Eskridge, supra note 71, at 1196-1200. A good recent judicial
consideration is Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 386, 432
N.E.2d 849, 852 (1982) (arguing, inter alia, that "[r]eal estate brokers occupy a position
of trust with respect to the purchasers with whom they are negotiating"). See also Note,
Real Estate Brokers' Duties to Prospective Purchasers, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 514-21 (dis-
cussing cases holding brokers liable to buyers for breach of duties that arise from fiduci-
ary relationship between buyer and broker or that are imposed by courts as matter of
public policy).
74 See Eskridge, supra note 71, at 1118-24, 1194-1200; Comment, Dual Agency in Resi-
dential Real Estate Brokerage: Conflict of Interest and Interests in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE 379,
387 (1982) (arguing that buyer's broker, because he gets share of seller's broker's com-
mission, "has exactly the same financial motivation as the seller's broker to quickly close
the deal at any relatively high price").
75 See Report, supra note 50, at 585. An additional problem is that buyers often
never obtain independent legal advice; they seek legal advice, if at all, jointly with the
seller. Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions: Dual Representation-Law-
yers Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 73, 73 (1983) ("In many real estate trans-
actions only one attorney is retained and acts for all parties.") (footnote omitted).
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brokers. Unless advised, sellers as a class would presumably be
equally unaware of such duties. But professional brokers should
quickly become aware and should be prompted, in serving their cli-
ents' interests as well as their own, to disseminate information and
facilitate seller compliance. 76 Because sellers as a class are better
advised, the purpose of the law-to avoid innocent injuries by stim-
ulating proper inquiries-is better served by shifting inquiry duties
to the seller.
When it is determined that a loss should be imposed on an un-
knowing seller rather than an unknowing buyer, a seller's knowl-
edge becomes irrelevant. A buyer, accordingly, should not be
required to offer proof concerning a seller's scienter. Preferring the
innocent buyer in this manner should also relieve him of the need to
show that he actually relied on the seller's misstatement. 77 The ac-
tual reliance element of traditional misrepresentation law requires
the buyer to demonstrate the materiality of the misstatement and his
causal reliance upon it.78 This actual reliance requirement can op-
erate to deny relief to many buyers who have in fact suffered eco-
nomic loss by purchasing property misdescribed by sellers.
A better approach on the reliance issue may be found in the
76 Cf. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389
(1984) (court imposes burden on brokers to inspect property for defects and to disclose
material defects to buyers because of "the benefit thus conferred on buyers" and "the
relative ease with which the burden can be sustained by brokers").
77 Even under this modification of misrepresentation law, sellers could still point to
a buyer's clear lack of reliance as indicating that the buyer did not actually suffer injury.
78 South v. Colip, 437 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (misrepresentation
must be of material fact and cause plaintiff to act in reliance on it); Diener Enters., Inc. v.
Miller, 35 Md. App. 410, 412, 371 A.2d 439, 441 (1977) (" 'Thus it is clear. . . that...
the plaintiff must show not only that he would not have performed the act from which
the injury resulted but for the misrepresentation, but also that the fact misrepresented
was the proximate cause of the injury.' ") (quoting Lustine Chevrolet v. Cadeaux, 19
Md. App. 30, 35, 308 A.2d 747, 751 (1973)); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note
16, § 108;James & Gray, supra note 17, at 497-502 (discussing materiality), 518-22 (dis-
cussing proximate cause).
Misrepresentations that result in small monetary loss or are insufficiently linked to a
buyer's essential needs have failed to satisfy the actual reliance element. See, e.g., Ever-
green Land Co. v. Gatti, 554 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (court suggested
that misstatements of quantity are material only if they represent more than 10% of
property's value); Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 42, 288 N.W.2d 95, 107
(1980) (item is material if reasonable person would attach importance to it or if vendor
knows or has reason to know that purchaser is likely to regard the matter as important).
See also Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent Non-Disclosure of a Multiple Murder in a Real Estate
Transaction, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 877, 891-97 (1984). Courts have also found reliance
lacking when the buyer knows the seller's statement is false when executing the purchase
agreement or casually fails to pursue available facts that would lead to the discovery of
the falsity. See, e.g., Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 1983); Fairmont Foods Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 616 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (misrepresentation action
failed because plaintiff would have discovered limitation on use of property had he been
reasonably diligent in making inquiries).
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rules governing personal property sales. Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, statements by sellers that become a part of the "basis
of the bargain" constitute express warranties. 79 If the seller
breaches, the buyer may recover without showing either his actual
reliance or the materiality of the misrepresentation.80 This "basis of
the bargain" is a distinctly watered-down reliance element and only
a slight obstacle for buyers.81 On its face, the Code denies recovery
only for injuries resulting from factual misstatements that are clearly
tangential to the buyer's interests and that the parties did not con-
template as any part of their agreement.
8 2
This diluted reliance requirement better adjudicates disputes
between buyers and sellers of real estate than the traditional, rigor-
ous misrepresentation reliance element. If a buyer suffers damage
because a seller misstated a parcel's quality or characteristics, the
seller, rather than the buyer, should suffer the loss. If a land use
illegality is minor and has little impact on the property's market
value, the proper approach is not to deny all relief for lack of materi-
79 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977). See, e.g., Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 15 Ohio App. 3d 25,
472 N.E.2d 380, 385 (1984) (veterinarian's statement about health of race horse prior to
sale became part of basis of bargain and, under U.C.C. § 2-313, constituted express
warranty).
80 See Marston v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1140, 1142-43
(W.D. Va. 1978) (when seller orally represented that product would control plaintiffis
insect problem, no proof of reliance required); U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 ("In actual
practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are
regarded as part of the descriptions of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement."); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 58, § 9-4, at 333 ("Buyer is entitled to legal protection
for compliance of goods with all of seller's promises and representations . . . even
though some may be of relatively small import.") (emphasis in original).
81 See D. WHALEY, supra note 15, at 34 (comments to U.C.C. § 2-313 "strive mightily
to repudiate" the old reliance requirement);J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 58, § 9-
2, at 328 (basis of bargain requirement is "a rather mysterious but much diluted reliance
requirement"), 332-39 (collecting case law and commentary on whether Code changes
reliance element in warranty actions, concluding that while what Code does to pre-Code
law is unclear, next 20 years may nonetheless witness its disappearance); Murray, "Basis
of the Bargain" Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283 (1982) (reviewing
dispute among courts and commentators and suggesting "reasonable expectations of
the buyer" test as resolution); Comment, The Meaning of "Part of the Basis of the Bargain, "
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 447, 448-50 (1979) (reviewing three common views of § 2-313
as requiring showing of reliance, no showing of reliance, or establishing presumption of
reliance).
82 Under the Code an express warranty is created by "[a]ny affirmation of fact or
promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes a part of
the basis of the bargain." U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1977) (emphasis added). Similarly,
"[a]ny description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty" that the goods will conform to the description offered. U.C.C. § 2-
313(l)(b) (1977). The official comment to § 2-313 also indicates that virtually all of the
seller's statements constitute express warranties: "all of the statements of the seller [be-
come part of the basis of the bargain] unless good reason is shown to the contrary." See
id. comment 8. See also G. WALLACH, supra note 58, 11.06[2].
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ality but to award lesser relief 8 3 A buyer should recover even
though he possessed information that would have led him to dis-
cover the illegal use unless his carelessness is so blatant as to indi-
cate that he considered the seller's statement irrelevant and ignored
it when setting his purchase price. When a misstating seller sells his
property at a higher price than it would command in a market where
all buyers knew of its illegal use, the seller gains an amount equal to
the buyer's loss. Little justification exists for allowing the seller to
retain this undeserved gain at the expense of a negligent buyer.8 4
83 Professor Palmer notes that many courts allow restitution for mistakes in the
quality or attributes of property being sold only if the mistake is basic or fundamental. 2
G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUrION § 12.2, at 533-38 (1978). One of the most impor-
tant facts in determining whether a mistake is basic is its effect on the economic equiva-
lence of the agreed-upon exchange: Rescission is normally allowed only if the mistake
resulted in a serious lack of equivalence. Id. at 534. Generally, Palmer asserts that this
materiality requirement derives from a desire to protect the expectations of contracting
parties: "In both business and personal affairs, parties build on their contract expecta-
tions, whether by action or inaction, and it is important in a highly organized society that
they be able to do so." Id. at 533. This desire to protect contractual expectations con-
flicts with, and must be weighed against, the desirability of achieving ajust result free of
hardship to one side and undue gain to the other. Id. at 533-36. In the case of land use
legality mistakes, a materiality requirement is appropriate when a buyer seeks rescission
of a real estate sales contract because rescission can considerably upset the contractual
expectations of sellers. See infra note 159. When the buyer desires or is willing to retain
the property and seeks only restitution of excess value paid to the seller, however, a
materiality requirement is unnecessary. The contractual expectations of a seller re-
quired to pay back part of the purchase price are not significantly frustrated because the
sale itself is respected. He is surprised only by having less money on hand, a surprise, of
course, that faces every defendant liable for damages. The fairness concern of returning
the undue gain to the buyer should prevail in this instance. At bottom, the issue is clear:
Is it better to let a seller retain $1,000 because he expected he would be able to do so, or
to force the seller to repay the $1,000 because he has been unjustly enriched at the
buyer's expense? Finally, it should be remembered that, as the materiality of the mis-
take decreases, so does the amount the seller must repay.
84 The Restatement of Restitution considers the plaintiff's negligence irrelevant in
awarding restitution for mistake. RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrtxoN § 59 (1937). This posi-
tion is correct given that the rationale underlying a grant of restitution for mistake is
simply the avoidance of unjust enrichment. See Fuller, Mistake and Error in the Law of
Contracts, 33 EMORY LJ. 41, 78-79 (1984) ("The entire concept of relief for mistake at
American law ultimately may be seen to rest on a basis of unjust enrichment."). Further-
more, it does not unduly upset the finality of contracts to require sellers to disgorge
their excess receipts. The exchange of goods at a fair price remains intact.
The buyer's negligence should bar recovery, if at all, only when the buyer seeks
contract rescission or other relief that would fully upset the contract and materially dis-
turb the seller's expectations. Professor Palmer argues that a plaintiff's negligence is
always relevant in deciding whether rescission should be granted. 3 G. PALMER, THE
LAw OF RESTrrUTION § 16.3, at 464-65 (1978) ("When a case turns on rescission for
mistake in basic assumptions, the negligence of the party seeking relief is always a rele-
vant factor, particularly if he also was the party whose act caused the mistake."). His
conclusion, however, may sweep too broadly. Palmer considers only cases in which the
plaintiff's active negligence was the sole cause of the mistake, as, for example, when a
land buyer erroneously looks at the wrong property or when a bidder miscalculates his
bid. Id. at 465. Such cases are like cases of simple unilateral mistake, where mistaken
plaintiffs are often denied rescission if they acted negligently. See, e.g., Cummings v.
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Such a buyer might logically be denied consequential damages, 85
but fairness requires that the seller return his ill-gotten gains to the
buyer without regard to the buyer's negligence.
E. The Innocent Seller and the Future of Misrepresentation
The caveat emptor doctrine retains little vigor in states that
have modified their misrepresentation law as described above. In its
place is a new-faced law of misrepresentation that imposes liability
on many sellers who have done little more than sell property con-
taining unlawful land uses. The operation of this new tort law of
real estate sales can be illustrated by the plight of a hypothetical
buyer of a duplex who fails to determine, after examining the du-
plex and checking local ordinances, that the building is too small to
use as a duplex under local zoning laws. 86 Under traditional misrep-
resentation law the seller would be liable to the buyer, if at all, only
if he knowingly asserted that the existing use was legal and if the
buyer was unable to discover the illegality after making diligent in-
quiries. 87 The fully revised misrepresentation law takes a vastly dif-
ferent tack. Under the developing doctrine of implied
representation the duplex owner, by showing the property as a du-
plex, implicitly represents that it can lawfully be used as such.88
Dusenbury, 129 Ill. App. 3d 338, 343, 472 N.E.2d 575, 579 (1984) (rescission allowed
for unilateral mistake because plaintiffs were not negligent). When the mistake is not
caused by the plaintiff but by unknown information equally available to both sides,
courts should grant relief regardless of a plaintiff's negligence in failing to uncover the
mistake.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts denies contract avoidance or reformation for
mutual and unilateral mistake only if the plaintiff's negligence "amounts to a failure to
act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealings," a stan-
dard akin to gross negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 157 & comment
a (1979). The Restatement also provides that a party who consciously contracts with only
limited knowledge of the facts bears the risk of the mistake and cannot void the contract.
Id. § 154(b). See also id. §§ 152(1), 153. It is difficult to apply these rules to a case in
which both the buyer and seller are ignorant of a major land use illegality. Arguably, the
buyer who makes no inquiries has assumed the risk under § 154(b), but such inaction
may nonetheless reflect good faith and compliance with standards of normal conduct,
thereby entitling him to rescission under § 157. The Restatement rules, however, pre-
sume that contract avoidance is the normal remedy for mistake. Because this remedy is
harsh on sellers, a buyer's negligence or gross negligence could reasonably serve as a
limit on that type of relief. If the buyer seeks only restitution, the effect on the seller is
much less severe and the buyer's negligence is irrelevant. See infra notes 160-64 and
accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
86 The example is derived from Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983). A
similar set of facts is presented in Strickland v. Vescovi, 3 Conn. App. 10, 484 A.2d 460
(1984) (seller who describes property as two family home implicitly represents that such
use is lawful and is liable for innocent misrepresentation).
87 See supra notes 42-44, 66, and accompanying text.
88 See Rosenlofv. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 373-75 (Utah 1983) (upholding jury ver-
dict for plaintiffs in misrepresentation action); supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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Courts that modify the law-fact distinction would interpret this rep-
resentation as an assertion of fact rather than of law, and hence ac-
tionable.8 9 Under diminished scienter rules, a court would presume
that a property owner knows or has reason to know the zoning sta-
tus of his property and hence automatically has the requisite mental
state, even without any actual knowledge of the illegality.90 A buyer
lacking strong reason to suspect that the existing land use is illegal
would not be obligated to inspect the public records: He could jus-
tifiably rely on the seller's implicit representation. 91 A court would
also presume actual buyer reliance9 2 in this case since the violation
is one that has substantial impact on the parcel's value and impli-
cates its quality.
These presumptions and conclusions virtually eliminate all ref-
erence to a seller's fault. The seller is liable, not because he has
intentionally misled the buyer, but simply because the property be-
ing sold cannot lawfully be used for its obvious, intended purpose.
Liability is imposed, that is, simply because the quality of the prop-
erty does not meet the normal, reasonable expectations of the aver-
age buyer. The imposition of such liability reflects a fundamental
belief that losses caused by illegal land uses, and hence the duty to
detect such illegalities, should routinely be imposed on the seller.
In effect, courts that have adopted these changes have modified the
normal real estate sales contract by adding an implied seller war-
ranty, actionable without regard to the seller's fault, that existing
uses of the real estate do not materially violate any land use
regulations.
II
OTHER DEVELOPING THEORIES OF BUYER RELIEF
Buyers surprised to find that their intended land usages are un-
lawful have occasionally obtained relief under theories other than
misrepresentation. These theories also reflect recent and increasing
judicial hostility to caveat emptor and a belief that sellers should be
liable for not disclosing known material land use violations and for
innocent as well as deliberate misstatements. Several recent deci-
sions expand relief further for buyers and provide additional evi-
dence of a developing judicial sense that innocent sellers should
bear unforeseen losses and, by implication, should have the duty to
prevent them.
California and Colorado courts have taken the lead in imposing
89 See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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on sellers affirmative obligations to disclose matters materially af-
fecting the value of the property.93 This information disclosure obli-
93 E.g., Clauser v.Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453,454, 112 P.2d 661,662 (1941) (seller
liable for not revealing building erected on a landfill); Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443,
447, 349 P.2d 366, 367 (1960) (latent soil defect creates duty of disclosure on seller who
is aware of defect). Earlier isolated decisions from other jurisdictions also imposed dis-
closure duties on selling landowners. E.g., O'Shea v. Morris, 112 Neb. 102, 103-04, 198
N.W. 866, 867 (1924) (upholding trial court's granting of rescission where sellers did
not disclose that they did not possess title to portion of lot containing driveway and
garage).
Other states have imposed disclosure duties in various circumstances or have de-
nied certain types of relief to sellers who have failed to disclose material facts. E.g.,
Lively v. Garnick, 160 Ga. App. 591, 595, 287 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1981) (intentional non-
disclosure of defect not discernible by purchaser, if undertaken with intent to deceive, is
fraudulent); Posner v. Davis, 76 Ill. App. 3d 638, 643-44, 395 N.E.2d 133, 137 (1979)
(seller has duty to disclose material latent physical defects known to him); Berman v.
Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 92-103, 458 A.2d 1311, 1313-20 (Ch. Div. 1981) (seller has
duty to disclose matters materially affecting value of property, but buyers represented by
legal counsel cannot be said to have reasonably relied on misrepresentations because
counsel should have discovered matter not disclosed); Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d
507 (N.D. 1985) (duty to disclose all material facts which are known or should be known
by seller); Millikin v. Green, 283 Or. 283, 285, 583 P.2d 548, 550 (1978) (seller has duty
to disclose latent material facts); Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa. Super. 176, 185-86, 324
A.2d 532, 536-37 (1974) (duty to disclose occasional sewer back up); Smith v. National
Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. 1979) (seller's failure to disclose
flood plain restriction estops seller from demanding contract performance); Ware v.
Scott, 220 Va. 317, 320-21, 257 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1979) (intentional nondisclosure of
material facts arising after contract execution constitutes fraudulent inducement to per-
form real estate purchase contract); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 175-76, 646
P.2d 771, 774 (1982) (seller has duty to disclose water problem); Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885, 886-88 (W. Va. 1982) (seller has duty to disclose that house was built on
filled ground, causing structural problems). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 161 (1979) (presenting rules for determining when "[a] person's non-disclosure of a
fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist").
Several of these jurisdictions, however, have materially qualified the seller's disclo-
sure duty. E.g., Lenzi v. Morkin, 103 Ill. 2d 290, 292-93, 469 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1984)
(no duty to disclose substantial increase in tax assessment value of property); Gill v.
Marquoit, 269 Or. 581, 585-86, 525 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1974) (no duty to disclose land's
susceptibility to flooding); Armentrout v. French, 220 Va. 458, 466, 258 S.E.2d 519, 524
(1979) ("purchaser of real estate must discover for himself the true condition of the
premises if he has information which would excite the suspicions of a reasonably pru-
dent person," but seller's efforts to divert attention or to conceal will result in liability)
(citation omitted); McPherson v. Purdue, 21 Wash. App. 450, 452-53, 585 P.2d 830,
831-32 (1978) (no duty to disclose serious title defect); Goldfarb v. Dietz, 8 Wash. App.
464, 470-71, 506 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1973) (seller has no duty to disclose nonconforming
use status of property because zoning code is rule of law).
Other jurisdictions have repeatedly rejected attempts to impose disclosure duties.
E.g., Security Title & Guaranty Co. v. Mid-Cape Realty, Inc., 723 F.2d 150, 154 (1st Cir.
1983) (no duty under Massachusetts law to disclose adverse claim to title); Nei v. Burley,
388 Mass. 307, 310, 446 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1983) (seller has no duty to disclose existence
of seasonal watercourse across property). But see Danca v. Taunton Say. Bank, 385 Mass.
1, 7-8, 429 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (1982) (mortgagee with copy of plot plan disclosing zon-
ing violation implicitly-and negligently-represents to mortgagor who is not shown the
plan that no violations exist). Buyers generally are under no obligation to make disclo-
sures to sellers. See, e.g, Zaschak v. Traverse Corp., 123 Mich. App. 126, 130, 333
N.W.2d 191, 192-93 (1983) ("Michigan law dictates that a prospective purchaser is
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gation applies broadly and includes defects in construction and soil
conditions as well as matters wholly external to the property that
appreciably affect its value.94 A highly publicized California deci-
sion provides an extreme illustration. The court imposed on the
seller a duty to disclose that the property had been the scene of a
mass murder several years earlier 95 and allowed the buyer to re-
cover a portion of the purchase price equal to the diminution in
value attributable to the incident.96 Several states have imposed sim-
ilar disclosure duties on brokers representing real estate sellers. 9
7
This disclosure duty is still in its formative stage and remains
imprecisely drawn. As applied to date, however, the duty is subject
to substantial limits and does not fully protect misled buyers. Sell-
ers generally need disclose only matters of which they have some
degree of personal knowledge. Thus, the complicated issue of a
seller's knowledge remains a major matter of dispute.98 Sellers,
moreover, need only disclose matters not reasonably ascertainable
by the buyer, a limit that denies relief to buyers who should have
known the relevant information.99 Under some formulations of the
under no duty to disclose facts or possible opportunities within his knowledge which
materially affect the value of the property.").
94 E.g., Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1982) (soil conditions); Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95
(1982) (termites); Millikin v. Green, 283 Or. 283, 583 P.2d 548 (1978) (roof problem);
Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa. Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532 (1974) (occasional sewer back-up).
95 Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983).
96 Id.; see also Note, supra note 78 (discussing this decision and arguing that court
defined materiality of nondisclosed fact in manner that was excessively subjective).
97 E.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387
(1984) (broker duty to inspect for and disclose matters materially affecting value of
property); Maples v. Porath, 638 S.W.2d 337, 339-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (broker po-
tentially liable for failure to disclose termite problem); Neveroski v. Blair, 141 NJ.
Super. 365, 373-75, 358 A.2d 473, 477-78 (App. Div. 1976) (broker concealed informa-
tion about termite infestation; buyer reasonably relied on broker); Crum v. McCoy, 41
Ohio Misc. 34, 38-39, 322 N.E.2d 161, 164-65 (1974) (principals liable for agent bro-
ker's concealment of defective sewer); Wilkinson v. Smith, 31 Wash. App. 1, 6-7, 639
P.2d 768, 771 (1982) (broker's personal interest in property); see Annot., 8 A.L.R.3D 550
(1966).
98 E.g., Lively v. Garnick, 160 Ga. App. 591, 595, 287 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1981) (seller
must know of problem); Shane v. Hoffmann, 227 Pa. Super. 176, 182, 324 A.2d 532, 536
(1974) (actual knowledge, reckless ignorance of falsity, or special duty to know truth
imposed because of special circumstances); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 888 (W.
Va. 1982) (seller must be aware of conditions or defects substantially affecting value of
property). On the requirement of showing the seller's scienter in misrepresentation law
generally, see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
99 E.g., Universal Inv. Co. v. Sahara Motor Inn, Inc., 127 Ariz. 213, 215, 619 P.2d
485, 487 (1980) (no duty to disclose electrical code violation that buyer could have dis-
covered through inspection); Cooper v.Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr.
724, 727 (1976) (facts must not be within reach of buyer through diligent attention and
observation); Creelman v. Rogowski, 152 Conn. 382, 385, 207 A.2d 272, 274 (1965)
(buyer must prove actual reliance on seller silence); Fairmont Foods Co. v. Skelly Oil
Co., 616 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (facts must not be discoverable by buyer
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duty the seller must also know or suspect that the buyer is acting in
ignorance. 100 Different jurisdictions limit relief in other ways. Wis-
consin, for example, only imposes disclosure duties on professional
sellers. 0 1 To date, courts imposing disclosure requirements on
sellers have considered and rendered decisions in a handful of law-
ful use cases.
10 2
Several states desiring to eliminate or restrict the caveat emptor
rule have enacted statutes to provide needed relief. The Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,'03 for example,
imposes liability on sellers and their real estate brokers for misstate-
in exercise of reasonable diligence); Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985) (no
duty to disclose matters that would be discoverable by buyer's exercise of ordinary care
and diligence). See also Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Owens, 62 N.C. App.
695, 699-700, 303 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1983) ("A purchaser who is on equal footing with
the vendor and has equal means of knowing the truth is contributorily negligent if he
relies on a vendor's statements regarding the physical condition of property."). Compare
Heverly v. Kirkendall, 257 Or. 232, 237, 478 P.2d 381, 383 (1970) (buyer negligence in
failing to discern truth is not defense in misrepresentation action).
100 E.g., Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 285, 294, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 449, 466 P.2d 996, 1001 (1970) (aside from cases of active concealment and
misleading partial disclosure, duty to disclose arises only if speaker knows that facts are
not known to or reasonably discoverable by plaintiff); Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d
860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) (disclosure duty arises when seller knows that
facts are not known to or within reach of diligent attention and observation of buyer).
101 See Kanack v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 434, 291 N.W.2d 864, 868 (1980) (non-
commercial vendor has no duty to disclose water problem to noncommercial purchaser);
Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 42, 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (1980) (subdivider-
vendor must disclose to noncommercial purchaser material facts know to vendor and
not readily discernible to purchaser). Both cases noted in Note, Propert-Caveat
Emptor-Duty to Disclose Limited to Commercial Vendors, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 547 (1981). The
commercial-noncommercial distinction presumes that buyers have greater confidence in
commercial sellers and are more likely to expect honesty and fair dealing from them.
102 See Nece v. Bennett, 212 Cal. App. 2d 494, 496-97, 28 Cal. Rptr. 117, 118-19
(1963) (no duty to disclose that conditions in zoning variance not met); Curran v. Hes-
lop, 115 Cal. App. 2d 476, 481, 252 P.2d 378, 381 (1953) (duty to disclose violation of
building codes); Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 692, 697, 209 P.2d 808, 811 (1949)
(duty to disclose that garage converted into apartments in violation of zoning ordi-
nance); Denton v. Hood, 122 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818, 461 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (1984) (no
duty to disclose zoning violation); Gamel v. Lewis, 373 S.W.2d 184, 192 (Mo. Ct. App.
1963) (duty to disclose special temporary deferment received under zoning ordinance);
O'Shea v. Morris, 112 Neb. 102, 104, 198 N.W. 866, 867 (1924) (fraud in seller's failure
to disclose that portion of driveway and garage extended off property when plaintiff did
not know and should not have known of situation); Heverly v. Kirkendall, 257 Or. 232,
234-35, 478 P.2d 381, 382-83 (1970) (nondisclosure that garage located partly off prop-
erty generated implied representation of lawful use); Goldfarb v. Dietz, 8 Wash. App.
464, 470-71, 506 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1973) (no duty to disclose nonconforming use status
of property when seller is ignorant of its status). See also Lively v. Garnick, 160 Ga. App.
591, 595, 287 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1981) (no duty to disclose that house built so close to
property boundary as to violate restrictive covenant and zoning ordinance where seller
did not know of violations); Bradbury v. Rentz, No. CA 7958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3,
1984) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (discussed infra
notes 129-31 and accompanying text).
103 TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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ments, regardless of scienter, and for knowing nondisclosures of
facts. 10 4 Illinois imposes a similar broad liability on real estate bro-
kers for false statements through thejoint operation of its Deceptive
Trade Practices and Consumer Fraud Acts.' 0 5 Additionally, Illinois
subjects brokers to strict liability for misrepresentations and may
have also created broad broker disclosure duties, under the state
statute regulating broker licensing and under administrative regula-
tions promulgated by the broker licensing board.' 0 6
104 See id. § 17.46(b)(5) (misrepresentation of characteristics, uses, etc.), (23) (know-
ing nondisclosure with intent to induce buyer action). On the application of the Act to
real estate sales and brokers, see, e.g., Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d
535, 538-40 (Tex. 1981) (buyer is "consumer" of services of seller's real estate agent);
Cobb v. Dunlap, 656 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (applying Act to knowing
nondisclosures before effective date of new subsection barring nondisclosures). See
Goodfriend & Lynn, Of White Knights and Black Knights: An Analysis of the 1979 Amendments
to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 33 Sw. LJ. 941, 948-50 (1979) (discussing lack of
scienter requirement for recovery of actual damages).
A real estate agent liable for misrepresentation may have a defense under the Act if,
in making his misstatement, he relied on written false information provided by the seller
that the agent did not know and could not reasonably have known was false. TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50B(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The Texas statute on fraud in
real estate transctions also contains no requirement of seller or broker knowledge of the
falsity of the misstatement but does require showings of intent to induce reliance by the
buyer and actual buyer reliance. Id. § 27.01 (incorporating id. § 27.01 (a) (1) (A) (Vernon
1968)).
105 Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121
/2, §§ 261-272 (Smith-Hurd 1984 Supp.); Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 311-317 (Smith-Hurd 1984 Supp.). See Buzzard v. Bolger,
117 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892-93, 453 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (1983) (action lies against broker
for innocent misrepresentation under the Acts); Beard v. Gress, 90 Ill. App. 3d 622,
625-28, 413 N.E.2d 448, 449-52 (1980) (broker liable for innocent misrepresentation,
for concealment and suppression, and for nondisclosure of material facts; diligence of
buyer in checking accuracy of misrepresentation is immaterial). The Consumer Fraud
Act was amended in 1982 to protect a broker against liability for communicating false,
misleading or deceptive information received from the seller unless the broker knows
that the information is false, misleading, or deceptive. 1982 Ill. Laws 82-766, § 1, codi-
fied at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 270b(4) (Smith-Hurd 1984 Supp.). The new provi-
sion probably cannot fulfill fully its intended purpose because it does not appear to
cover broker liability for nondisclosure or concealment or for the misrepresentation of
information not provided by sellers. See Julian v. Spiegel, 481 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ill.
1985) (buyer required to present evidence that false information provided by broker did
not come from seller).
106 See Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v.Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 384-85, 432 N.E.2d
849, 851 (1982) (failure to disclose self-interest in transaction will support implied pri-
vate cause of action under regulations promulgated pursuant to the Real Estate Brokers
and Salesmen License Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 5701-5743 (Smith-Hurd 1977));
Annot., 28 A.L.R. 4TH 199 (1984). For decisions from other jurisdictions, see, e.g.,
Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985) (violation by broker of code of ethics
provides evidence of negligence in malpractice action); Strauss v. Latter & Blum, Inc.,
431 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (broker liable for nondisclosure under state decep-
tive trade practices act if defect known to him) (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1455,
51:1405 (West 1965 & Supp. 1985)); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass. App. 246, 247-49,
407 N.E.2d 352, 354-55 (1980) (broker's failure to disclose material fact that could influ-
ence buyer is actionable under state deceptive practices act) (citing MAss. GEN. LAws
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Courts should expansively apply these statutes to landowners
and brokers selling parcels that violate land use restraints if the
buyer is appreciably injured. Given the vagueness of the statutes,
however, it is too early to determine what types of land use viola-
tions will be sufficiently material to require that they be disclosed
and what types of seller or broker statements or conduct will consti-
tute implied assertions of lawful use. 10 7 These various statutes and
decisions, however, do demonstrate a growing willingness in many
jurisdictions to impose liability on sellers and their agents for mate-
rial misstatements regardless of many of the traditional misrepre-
sentation rules.
08
The forced disclosure approach largely shifts back to the seller
the risk of innocent loss and thus the duty to make inquiries into the
legality of existing uses. The limits on mandatory disclosures, how-
ever, create uncertainty and restrict considerably the protections af-
forded buyers. Sellers often need only disclose matters they know.
Thus, the disclosure approach can trigger disputes concerning the
extent of a seller's knowledge and leaves buyers unprotected against
innocent nondisclosures. 0 9 A court may also deny a buyer relief if
the seller reasonably believed that the buyer knew of the illegal uses
or if the buyer negligently failed to discover them." 0 Many disclo-
sure duties, moreover, are triggered only by latent material facts,
thereby inviting dispute over the materiality of the undisclosed
fact."' Finally, a breach of the disclosure duty is tantamount only
to a misrepresentation that existing uses are lawful; a buyer's recov-
ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 2, 9 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985)); State ex reL McLeod v. C & L Corp.,
313 S.E.2d 334, 338 (S.C. App. 1984) (real estate purchasers need not prove elements
of common law fraud to prove violation of state unfair trade practices act) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1985)); Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 589-90, 675 P.2d 193, 199-200 (1983) (duty arises under state
consumer protection act to inform parties to real estate closing of advisability of ob-
taining independent counsel; here, court applied duty to escrow agent) (citing WAsH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010 to .920 (1978)); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173,
176, 177, 646 P.2d 771, 774, 775 (1982) (broker has duty under state consumer protec-
tion act to disclose matters known to broker; broker must use care to ascertain condi-
tions of property before listing).
107 Applications involving land use illegalities have been few so far. See, e.g, Heritage
Housing Corp. v. Ferguson, 674 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (applying Texas Act
to seller of house built one foot over zoning setback line). See also Koonce v. Chastain,
674 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (applying Texas Act to misrepresentation that
certain lots would be restricted to residential use), aff'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct.J. 509 (1985).
108 But see, e.g., Barnes v. Weitzel, 678 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (plain-
tiff under Texas Act must show actual reliance on misrepresentation).
109 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
1O See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
11 E.g., Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 42, 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (1980)
(claim for misrepresentation requires that fact not disclosed or inaccurately related be
material; fact is material if reasonable purchaser would attach importance to its exist-
ence). See Note, supra note 78, at 891-97.
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ery may still depend on his proving the other traditional elements of
misrepresentation law.'
12
Courts have occasionally displayed a willingness to sidestep the
traditional elements of misrepresentation law by awarding relief to
buyers under rescission and restitution rules. 113 Many courts allow
contract rescission in the case of an innocent misrepresentation or a
mutual mistake, even in jurisdictions that require in misrepresenta-
tion a clear showing of seller scienter. 114 Courts have awarded resti-
tution for unjust enrichment in cases of both intentional and
innocent misrepresentation and in cases of mutual mistake." 15
Traditional principles of rescission and restitution can amelio-
rate many of the inequitable applications of the longstanding ele-
ments of misrepresentation, but the underlying prerequisites of
innocent misrepresentation, mutual mistake, and unjust enrichment
raise troubling and complex factual questions and are subject to sev-
eral drawbacks. The principles of rescission and restitution are es-
pecially vague, a characteristic that undercuts the ability of parties to
rely on probable future events. Moreover, equitable principles do
112 See, e.g., Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 102-03, 458 A.2d 1311, 1319
(Ch. Div. 1981) (requirement that reliance be measured by knowledge gained or which
could have been gained by reasonable diligence). -See also cases cited supra at notes 93-
95; PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, at 737-40; Note, supra note 78, at
886-92 (discussing issues of materiality, buyer knowledge, and buyer inquiry duties).
1"3 E.g., Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1982) (facially true statement may
constitute actionable misrepresentation if it causes false impression as to true state of
affairs, and speaker fails to cure mistaken belief); Dawley v. Sinclair, 419 So. 2d 534, 535
(La. Ct. App. 1982); Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. 1982) (when parties
are mistaken about zoning classification, necessary consent between them is lacking, and
purchase agreement is thus invalid); McKay v. McIntosh, 270 N.C. 69, 72, 153 S.E.2d
800, 803 (1967) (trial court's grant of rescission justified when sufficient evidence sup-
ported finding that the purchaser's sole interest in buying property was to use it for
business and the agent's representation that property was zoned for business induced
purchaser's agreement).
On the general trend in contract law to increase the ease with which parties can back
out of contracts because of mistake, frustration, or manifest injustice, see G. GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 65-66, 77-83 (1974).
114 Compare Sachs v. Swartz, 233 Ga. 99, 103, 209 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1974) (rescission
allowed for misrepresentation as to zoning status) with Davis v. Northside Realty As-
socs., 165 Ga. App. 96, 96-97, 299 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1983) (no damage liability for mis-
representation of zoning status since it is misrepresentation of law).
115 E.g., Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1 (Del. 1982) (innocent misrepresentation);
Dawley v. Sinclair, 419 So. 2d 534 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (innocent misrepresentation);
Ortego v. Lebert, 406 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (intentional misrepresentation);
Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1982) (mutual mistake); MacKay v. McIntosh,
270 N.C. 69, 153 S.E.2d 800 (1967) (innocent misrepresentation); Gardner Homes, Inc.
v. Gaither, 31 N.C. App. 118, 228 S.E.2d 525 (1976) (mutal mistake); Slocum v. Leffler,
272 Or. 700, 538 P.2d 906 (1975) (innocent misrepresentation); Sawyer v. Pierce, 580
S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (intentional misrepresentation). As between the al-
terate remedies of restitution and rescission, a buyer might logically prefer the former
since it would allow him to retain the property with its land use violations while reducing
the purchase price to an amount that reflects the property's true fair market value.
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not squarely place any duty to investigate on any party and therefore
rarely prompt parties to avoid the problem in the first instance. Ad-
ditionally, the rules provide sellers with only modest incentives to
divulge information known to them about the existence of land use
violations. Finally, these kinds of relief are often incomplete and, at
times, clearly inadequate. Rescission is available only if both parties
can be restored to the status quo ante. This resolution is often im-
possible because a party has acted in reliance upon the finality of the
sale.' 16 Restitution returns the purchase price to a buyer but fails to
reimburse him for even foreseeable consequential damages, which
may be his principal loss."
17
III
TOWARD A NEW IMPLIED WARRANTY OF LAWFUL USE
Many courts, it is clear, are dissatisfied today with the applica-
tion of the caveat emptor doctrine to real estate sales. They have
expressed their dissatisfaction by seizing upon a variety of theories
that soften the doctrine's impact on unsuspecting and poorly ad-
vised buyers. The theories employed by these courts, however, all
suffer from multiple inadequacies. These inadequacies can be best
resolved, and the caveat emptor rule best altered, through an ap-
proach not yet used expressly by any court: the judicial develop-
ment of an implied warranty in all real estate sales contracts that
116 E.g., Niesz v. Gehris, 418 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (in suit for rescis-
sion, buyer must return property and all benefits received); Luciani v. Bestor, 106 Ill.
App. 3d 878, 882, 436 N.E.2d 251, 255 (1982) (court sitting in equity will not decree
rescission unless both parties can be restored to status quo ante); DePuy v. Bodine, 509
S.W.2d 689, 699 (rex. Civ. App. 1974) (plaintiff in suit for rescission must ordinarily
restore consideration received by him; that is, reestablish status quo of other party).
Other limits on rescission also exist. See, e.g., Page Inv. Co. v. Staley, 105 Ariz. 562, 564,
468 P.2d 589, 591 (1970) (by accepting deed after learning of falsity of seller representa-
tion as to rezoning possibilities, purchaser ratifies contract and relinquishes right to seek
rescission); Rolf's Marina, Inc. v. Rescue Serv. & Repair, Inc., 398 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (plaintiff lost right to rescind when he inadvertently ratified contract
after discovering zoning problem); Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, Inc., 375
So. 2d 1089, 1092-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming trial court denial of claim for
rescission where plaintiffwaited five months before acting); Evergreen Land Co. v. Gatti,
554 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (no rescission unless error material); Watson
v. Fantus, 275 Or. 605, 610, 552 P.2d 251, 253 (1976) (rescission denied for failure to
seek relief promptly). See also Lawton v. Dracousis, 14 Mass. App. 164, 172-73, 437
N.E.2d 543, 548 (1982) (where contract was silent on possibility of building code viola-
tions and sellers made no representations concerning code, purchaser assumed risk of
existence of such violations); Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17,
31-33, 331 N.W.2d 203, 210-11 (1982) ("as is" clause in contract for sale of real estate
shifted risk to purchaser); DiDonato v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 433 Pa. 221, 224,
249 A.2d 327, 329 (1969) (when zoning law changed after contract for sale of land com-
pleted but before actual conveyance, risk normally allocated to purchaser).
117 For example, when the buyer has moved into the property and must now move
out, he may incur substantial relocation expenses.
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existing property uses and other uses described by the seller comply
with applicable land use restraints.
Such an implied warranty would be a central element of the
contract, operating together with express property descriptions, im-
plied title warranties, and, where applicable, implied warranties of
habitability and fitness as the critical specifications of the property
being conveyed. The implied warranty of lawful use could be altered
by the parties and therefore would not unduly restrict the parties'
freedom to contract. Upon breach, the warranty would give rise to
damages and other relief in accordance with the traditional princi-
ples for calculating and limiting contract remedies. Buyers could
seek relief for warranty violations both before and after the closing
of the sale transaction.' 1
8
The implied warranty approach offers numerous benefits over
the current, uneasy mix of caveat emptor and the palliative rules on
misrepresentation and restitution. The implied warranty comports
much better than current law with the legitimate expectations of
normal buyers that they can lawfully continue existing land uses.
The alternative theories available at this time all seek to blame the
seller for some fault or mistake. But the legitimacy of the buyer's
expectations and the reasons for protecting those expectations are
not based on blameworthy conduct by sellers. The issue is not one
of fault-the traditional domain of tort law. The issue, rather, re-
lates to the property's characteristics and qualities. The specifica-
tion of these characteristics and uses is traditionally and legitimately
an issue of contract law.' 19 A second benefit of the implied warranty
118 Thus, the implied warranty would not be merged into the deed under the much-
discredited (but still surviving) doctrine of merger. See supra note 15.
119 The modified misrepresentation action described above is essentially a strict lia-
bility tort. Such a tort action, if properly designed, could achieve the same beneficial
results as the implied warranty. Caution should be taken, however, in developing such a
tort. First, the duty imposed on a seller should be the duty to disclose rather than a duty
to convey property free of illegalities. The seller should be allowed to fulfill his duty by
disclosing any illegality to the buyer. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, the duty of disclosure should obligate the seller to disclose all illegalities, however
slight. Moreover, this duty should obtain regardless of whether the buyer or the seller
knows of the illegality. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
A court that undertakes to develop a strict liability disclosure duty of this type
should tailor it to match the proposed implied warranty and should not weaken it in a
way that undercuts the several benefits of imposing on sellers a clear duty to discover all
land use illegalities. This task is feasible, but it will require courts to phrase the disclo-
sure duty in a way that may sound unduly harsh. Courts will need to require sellers to
disclose matters of which they are unaware, matters that seem immaterial, and matters of
which the buyer is aware. A court could soften the apparent unreasonableness of this
duty by holding that a seller has a duty to inspect as well as disclose. This approach
would enable a court to assert that a seller unaware of an illegality is at "fault" for failing
to discover it, an assertion that may seem more judicious than a contention that his
"fault" lies entirely in nondisclosure. Yet, even by combining disclosure and inspection
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approach is that it is likely to reduce the incidence of seller-buyer
disputes in the first instance. The warranty places losses, and there-
fore inquiry duties, on the seller, who is better able to make the
needed inquiries than is the buyer.
120
The implied warranty offers substantial advantages over tort-
based theories of recovery to both buyers and sellers. For buyers,
the warranty provides a broader recovery and eliminates the troub-
lesome issues of knowledge and scienter, materiality, and actual,
reasonable reliance. Indeed, as in other breach of warranty actions,
duties, a court will need to employ seemingly harsh language: It will need to formulate
an inspection duty that is satisfied not by a reasonable or diligent inspection but only by
an inspection that in fact succeeds in discovering all illegalities. The theoretical prob-
lem, of course, stems from the fault-based heritage of tort law. When developing tort
liability rules, courts are more comfortable if they can phrase a new rule so that it im-
poses liability on conduct that appears blameworthy. In this setting, a court developing
a tort theory of recovery for buyers would need to impose liability on sellers at times for
conduct that lacks this quality. This hurdle can be overcome, as evidenced by the strict
liability rules applied in products liability actions. Cf Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d
454, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116 (1985) (landlord in business of leasing residential
apartments is strictly liable for injuries caused by latent defects in leased premises at
beginning of lease term, regardless of landlord's ability to detect them). Contract law, by
contrast, has had less concern with seller fault and has long held sellers to strict stan-
dards in warranty situations.
A further problem with the tort approach is that normal tort rules for calculating
damages are unduly generous in this setting. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying
text. Land use illegalities often diminish the value of property only slightly. When the
seller is liable because he conveyed property worth marginally less than the sale price, it
is unjust to impose on him damages in excess of the lost value attributable to the illegal-
ity. Moreover, in many cases illegalities in the property found after the sale of the prop-
erty can be eliminated by altering the applicable land use standards. Buyers who can
obtain such alterations should have their recovery limited to their costs in doing so. A
buyer who corrects an illegal condition by repairing or constructing anew should not
recover the full cost of repairs or construction when the property, after such activity, is
worth more than he paid for it. Consider the case of a property ready for demolition. A
recovery under a tort theory based on repair costs is inappropriate because the prop-
erty's market value is likely to be based entirely on the value of the underlying land. A
court would have to manipulate tort theory to achieve a just result in such an instance.
Under an approach using a market price differential for calculating damages, however,
no recovery would be forthcoming. Even in less extreme cases, the sale price of used
real estate reflects its diminished condition.
Finally, the limitations under a tort action begin only when the buyer discovers the
illegality. See, e.g., Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1963) (limitations period
for fraud begins when fraud is discovered or might have been discovered had plaintiff
been reasonably diligent). In the context of actions brought after the first few years
following the sale, such a limitations rule is appropriate only when coupled with a re-
quirement that the buyer be ousted or the authorities begin to enforce the applicable
standard. See infra text accompanying notes 168-75.
Even if tailored in this manner, a strict liability tort action may still prove inadequate
in a state that does not permit recovery for economic loss in strict liability actions. See,
e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 86, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450
(1982). The economic loss limit, however, need not be a problem. The limitation is not
applied in misrepresentation actions; by analogy, it need not be applied in this setting.
120 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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the only issue in dispute in many cases is likely to be the issue of
damages. For sellers, the warranty imposes broader and more abso-
lute duties but offers to them the clearer rules on modification,
waiver, and remedies that typify contract-based recoveries. Sellers
would benefit from the clearer contract-based rules on warranty ex-
clusions and limitations periods.1 21 They would also benefit from
the contract rules limiting buyer recovery to actual out-of-pocket
losses and subjecting consequential damage requests to foreseeabil-
ity rules and mitigation requirements.'
22
The implied warranty offers two other, more public benefits.
First, an implied warranty would reduce the pressure on the tort law
of misrepresentation by eliminating the need for courts to manipu-
late the tort's elements to protect sympathetic buyers. Misrepresen-
tation is a tort of broad application, and its traditional elements are
reasonable when blameworthy deception is the gravamen of the
complaint. Courts anxious to protect injured buyers of real prop-
erty should not distort these traditional elements without fully con-
sidering their value in other situations. The tort of
misrepresentation is well suited to disputes over the fault of the
speaker or the applicable standards of due care. In contrast, the
dispute between a buyer and seller about the lawful use of a parcel
relates principally to the quality, of the property sold. Transferring
this issue from tort to contract, as the implied warranty does, could
facilitate the orderly, reasoned development of the law of
misrepresentation.
Second, the implied warranty should promote the public inter-
est by enhancing compliance with public land use regulations. Zon-
ing ordinances, building codes, and other restraints serve important
public interests, interests that are frustrated by noncompliance.
The implied warranty imposes on the seller a duty to identify these
public land use restraints and determine whether they are being vio-
lated. Current law largely places this task on the buyer, who is less
likely to perform it.123 The implied warranty, by shifting the duty to
make inquiries, should therefore improve the identification if not
the correction of land use violations.
The judicial creation of the implied warranty of continued law-
ful use is supported by substantial precedent. Decades ago, courts
developed warranties of title in real estate sale transactions and im-
plied them in contracts in which the transferor had employed cer-
121 See infra notes 152-54, 169-74 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 71-75. It is possible that the implied warranty,
by adding visibility to land use restraints, might add pressure for the reform of those
that seem outdated or irrational.
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tain language of conveyance. 124 More recently, courts have implied
a warranty relating to the quality of the property-variously termed
a warranty of habitability, fitness, or workmanlike construction-in
transfers of new residential property.' 25 The development of the
warranty of habitability reflects a clear willingness by courts to cre-
ate new warranty theories where needed to conform property law to
widely shared values and expectations. Further evidence of this ju-
dicial willingness to create implied warranties as needed is displayed
by the tendency of courts to find implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing in contracts of various types.' 2
6
Years ago courts also devised implied warranties that reflected
the legitimate expectations of parties to transfers of personal prop-
erty, a process of warranty development that was then continued
and refined by legislatures in the Uniform Sales Act and subsequent
Uniform Commercial Code.' 27 Real property transfer rules have
developed more slowly, yet the process of development has clearly
begun. An implied warranty of lawful use is an obvious and needed
step in this development. Popular expectations and standards of
fairness have advanced today to a point where its converse-the ca-
veat emptor rule-is aberrational and anachronistic.' 28
124 See W. RAwL, THE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR TrrLE §§ 1-3, 13-15 (5th ed. 1887).
Today covenants of title are not implied in a deed unless the deed employs particular
words (such as "warrants") that by statute carry with them implied title covenants. See,
e.g, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
125 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
126 E.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 767,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (1984) (California law implies in every
contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Norgate Homes, Inc. v. Central State
Bank, 82 A.D.2d 849, 850, 440 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (1981) (covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied in real estate sale contract); Burton, supra note 45, at 404 (extensive case
citation to states implying such covenants).
127 See 2 WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 15-1 to 15-7 (A. Squillante &J. Fonesca 4th ed.
1974); Rasor, The History of Warranties of Quality in the Sale of Goods: Contract or Tort?-A
Case Study in Full Circles, 21 WASH. LJ. 175, 189-214 (1982) (analyzing development of
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose in Kansas both
before and after Kansas's adoption of Uniform Commercial Code).
128 Certainly it can be said without fear of contradiction that both case law
and legislation during the past fifty years evidence an ever-widening rec-
ognition of the idea that reasonable expectations of purchasers should not be
frustrated. This means, therefore, a corresponding restriction on the
seller's freedom of disposition and a recognition of the idea that, in gen-
eral, the risk of loss should be on the seller if it appears after the sale has
been consummated that the subject matter of the transaction is not in all
respects as valuable or not as satisfactory for the purchaser's purpose as
expected.
Keeton, supra note 3, at 1. Keeton was perhaps a bit premature, however, in concluding
that, in both real property and personal property sales, "it may be more nearly correct
[today] to say caveat venditor, or let the seller beware." Id. at 2.
For a fine argument that traditional contract law focuses too exclusively on the exact
terms of party promises and far too little on party expectations, the social context of
contractual dealings, and nonpromissory sources of rights and obligations, see Lightsey,
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Although no court has yet implied a warranty of lawful use in a
contract tranferring real estate, several courts have manipulated tort
law to achieve similar results. In Bradbury v. Rentz, 129 the Ohio
Court of Appeals imposed liability on a seller of a tavern who failed
to disclose to the purchaser that the applicable occupancy certificate
limited the building's use to the businesses of bicycle sales and lawn
mower repairs. The court eliminated the issue of the seller's knowl-
edge by determining that a selling landowner should know of any
zoning restrictions applicable to his property. °30 The court also
eliminated the need for any express misstatement of legality by as-
serting that a seller commits "fraudulent misrepresentation" when
he fails to disclose a material fact such as a zoning violation.' 3 ' In
effect, the seller was strictly liable simply for having sold property
that materially violated land use restraints.
In a similar fashion the Colorado Court of Appeals imposed lia-
bility on a seller of property remodeled in violation of applicable
building codes. In Iverson v. Solsbery,132 the court stated that each
landowner owes a duty to the future owners not to reconstruct or
remodel property in violation of building codes. 33 Breach of that
duty entitles subsequent owners to damage remedies. 3 4 The
seller's knowledge of the code violations is apparently irrelevant
under this liability theory. As in Bradbury, the Iverson court effec-
A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45 (1984). Lightsey
proposes, as an alternative to the traditional promise model, an exchange-relationship
model that determines party rights and duties by looking to general societal norms of
fairness and reciprocity and trade customs as well as to the precise party promises.
129 No. CA 7958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1984) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file). A California appellate court employed similar logic in Birch v.
Circia, 205 Cal. App. 2d 1, 22 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962). An owner sold property containing
a basement apartment constructed without a building permit and, as such, not lawfully
rentable. The seller's description of the property as a multiple dwelling constituted an
implicit representation that use of the basement apartment was lawful. The court up-
held the trial court's finding that the seller knew of the necessity for obtaining a building
permit, pointing to evidence indicating that the seller was a maintenance man.
One decision following a contract law approach is Mayo v. Andress, 373 So. 2d 620
(Ala. 1979), in which the court construed various oral assurances by the seller as con-
tractual guarantees that the property was not subject to any restrictive covenants. The
court avoided a potential parol evidence rule problem by concluding that the oral assur-
ances supplemented rather than contradicted the purchase agreement and deed. Id. at
624-25. See also Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 285, 293-94, 85
Cal. Rptr. 444, 449, 466 P.2d 996, 1001 (1970) (holding city liable in contract for non-
disclosure of material facts relating to construction contract where city was immune
from tort liability).
130 No. CA 7958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1984) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file).
131 Id.
132 641 P.2d 314 (Colo. App. 1982).
133 Id. at 316.
134 Id.
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tively held the seller strictly liable for selling property that violated
applicable land use restraints.13 5 In short, despite references to
seller fraud and unreasonable seller conduct, both courts imposed
liability without regard to fault, thereby achieving results similar to
those that would be obtained through the implication of a warranty
of lawful use.
These two courts and several others have evidenced a clear will-
ingness to manipulate tort law so that results in misrepresentation
actions conform with popular values and expectations. Yet, for rea-
sons not clear, these courts have failed to take the next logical step
and create a new implied warranty. The explanation for this failure
may lie in a judicial belief that implied warranties are unnecessary
because parties to sale transactions are always free to insert express
warranties into their contracts. Hesitancy based on this belief is un-
warranted, however, and inconsistent with recent developments in
tort law. 13 6 Under product liability law, to use a conspicuous exam-
ple, courts have been willing to expand tort liability to protect the
reasonable expectations of buyers even though, in theory, the par-
ties could have inserted warranties in the sale contract. 137 Courts
may also perceive that the implication of warranties infringes on the
parties' freedom to contract. An implied warranty subject to con-
tractual modification,138 however, simply conforms the contract to
normal expectations and does not seriously infringe on the parties'
freedom to agree on contrary terms.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in Ogan v. Ellison, 13
9
adopted a contract-based theory of recovery bearing a substantial
similarity to the implied warranty of continued lawful use. The de-
fendant in Ogan sold property that had not been lawfully parti-
135 The reasoning adopted by the Iverson court logically would impose liability only
if the seller is responsible for creating the land use violation: "Moreover, we find it both
reasonable and just that the ultimate consequences which result from violation of the
building code should be borne by the person who initially perpetrated that violation."
Id. at 316. Under the court's analysis, the seller's liability rests on the seller's violation
of the ordinance rather than on his act of selling. Sellers will often violate ordinances
simply by owning property with physical structures that violate zoning codes or other
restrictions. A court following Iverson's logic might not find such sellers liable if they did
not personally engage in the construction that produced the violation. Thus, some sell-
ers would escape liability under such reasoning.
136 For a general consideration of the justification for warranties implied or imposed
by law, see Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Prod-
uct Quality, 24J. OF L. & EcoN. 461 (1981); Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product War-
ranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297 (1981); Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
137 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 16, at 677-724 (describing devel-
opment of negligence, warranty, and strict liability theories in products liability law).
138 See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
139 682 P.2d 760 (Or. 1984).
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tioned.140 The sale gave rise to an implied seller representation that
the property had in fact been partitioned as required by statute.
141
The court concluded that this representation resulted in the seller's
liability for misrepresentation and fraud upon breach.1 42 The
buyer, however, had the option of affirming the contract and treat-
ing the misrepresentation as a contract breach. 143 In short, the Ogan
court treated the implied representation as a contractual warranty.
The Ogan court's reliance on an Oregon statute expressly prohibit-
ing the transfer of property not properly partitioned may limit the
decision's precedential value. 144 Moreover, the court did not clearly
dismiss seller knowledge as irrelevant. 145 Nonetheless, the decision
is perhaps the strongest indication to date of the willingness of
courts to provide contractual relief to buyers whose lawful use ex-
pectations have been frustrated.
140 Id. at 761-62.
141 Id. at 763.
142 Id. at 763-65. The Ogan court held that the plaintiff's pleadings were sufficient to
support breach of contract and fraud claims, id. at 765; it remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings because the court determined that genuine issues of fact
remained. Id. at 766. In affirming the possibility of tort liability in misrepresentation,
the court accepted as true the buyer's allegations that he was ignorant of the illegality
and the seller was not Id. at 763-65.
143 Id. at 763.
144 OR. REV. STAT. § 92.016(2) (1983) ("[N]o person may sell any parcel . . . for
which.approval of a tentative plan is required .. "). Other statutory schemes some-
times provide buyer remedies if land has not been developed properly. See, e.g, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 58:17:210 (West Supp. 1985) ("All purchasers' . . . property shall
comply with provisions of this chapter and each purchaser. . . may recover his damages
. . . including any amount reasonably spent as a result of inability to obtain any devel-
opment permit and spent to conform to the requirements of this chapter....") (cited
in Busch v. Nervik, 38 Wash. App. 541, 547, 687 P.2d 872, 876 (1984) (upholding rescis-
sion of contract for purchase of land that was not properly platted)).
145 In setting forth its holding, the court assumed that the seller had concealed the
lack of partitioning, suggesting that the seller knew of the illegality. Ogan, 682 P.2d at
763. Moreover, the court in its misrepresentation and fraud discussion expressly as-
sumed that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the seller had such knowledge. Id.
at 765. The court in its contract breach discussion, however, did not mention the
seller's knowledge as an item that the plaintiff needed to prove. Such knowledge is nor-
mally irrelevant in actions for breach of contract.
The court's proposed approach differs in other ways from the implied warranty set
forth in this Article. The court asserted that the buyer was unaware of the illegality. Id.
at 763. Such an approach interjects an issue-the buyer's knowledge-that is consid-
ered irrelevant here. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text. Moreover, the court
distinguished, but did not overrule, its earlier decision in Mitchell v. Chernecki, 286 Or.
285, 593 P.2d 1163 (1979); Mitchell held that a purchaser who should have known of
zoning ordinance and building code violations could not affirm the contract and obtain
damages. Id. at 291-92, 593 P.2d at 1166 (discussed in Ogan, 682 P.2d at 762-63).
Although the Ogan court did not discuss damage issues, the plaintiff sought the differ-
ence between the value of the property as represented and its value in fact. 682 P.2d at
762. This Article recommends that damages ordinarily be limited to the difference be-
tween the purchase price and the value of the property in fact. See infra notes 155-58 and
accompanying text. The two approaches will not always yield identical results.
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A. Scope of the Warranty
In developing the new implied warranty of lawful use, courts
will encounter several issues similar to those raised by the new war-
ranties of habitability and residential fitness. Resolution of these is-
sues, however, should not be unduly difficult. The applicability of
the new warranty to commercial property and to corporate or other
commercial buyers is one issue likely to confront courts early in the
development of the warranty. Recently developed warranties of
habitability limit the protection of buyers to those purchasing resi-
dential property and, in some states, to residential property
purchased for the personal use of a noncommercial buyer. 146 The
limitation to noncommercial property derives from the "habitability"
origins of the warranty. This limitation might reflect an awareness
of the difficulty of trying to define the minimum fitness or usability
of a factory building or other commercial property. Limitation of
the implied warranty of habitability to noncommercial purchasers is a
distinctly minority approach. This limitation evinces a belief that
commercial purchasers know more about their needs and rights and
can adequately assert them.147
Neither limitation comports logically or practically with the im-
plied warranty of lawful use. First, commercial purchasers do not
always know more about the need to check land use restrictions.
Second, the implied warranty in the commercial context, as in per-
sonal and residential property settings, better reflects and protects
the normal expectations of buyers. Third, the implied warranty of
lawful use in commercial as well as residential settings shifts inquiry
duties to the party better able to perform them. Finally, if commer-
cial purchasers may not assert warranty claims, they will turn to mis-
representation relief, with all its attendant complications. The
commercial-noncommercial purchaser distinction, in short, lacks
any persuasive rationale in this setting and should not be incorpo-
rated in the new implied warranty of lawful use.
146 See, e.g., Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 658-59 (Fla. 1983) (implied warranty
of fitness and merchantability only extends to improvements physically supporting
building); Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 262-63, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1339
(1981) (warranty of habitability does not extend to commercial property which includes
apartments purchased to produce income); M. Friedman, supra note 3, at 47-53. But see
Hodgson v. Chin, 168 NJ. Super. 549, 553-55, 403 A.2d 942, 944-45 (App. Div. 1979)
(warranty applies to building that is part commercial and part residential); Brown v.
Sandwood Dev. Corp., 291 S.E.2d 375, 377 (S.C. 1982) (warranty applied to dam and
spillway).
147 See Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 263, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1339
(1981) ("The income-seeker, whether he be purchasing . . . real estate, or any other
form of investment, has ample opportunity to investigate, study, appraise, and assess
... . [T]he [noncommercial] vendee is seeking shelter for himself and his family, of-
tentimes under considerable pressure.")
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It is also inappropriate to limit the warranty of lawful use to
sales of noncommercial property. Courts have confined warranties
of habitability to residential property for reasons that reflect practi-
cal concerns in defining and applying a common law standard of
fitness for a commercial structure. The limitation also reflects an
assumption that purchasers of commercial property can adequately
protect themselves. This assumption is by no means true in the con-
text of lawful use, particularly in the case of purchasers of small
businesses and relatively inexpensive investment property. The un-
derlying rationale of the implied warranty does not require that a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial buyers be
drawn. The increase in awareness of and adherence to land use re-
strictions obtains in both commercial and noncommercial settings.
Moreover, the seller is also the party better able to investigate land
use violations regardless of whether the purchaser is a commercial
buyer. Finally, the addition of any commercial-noncommercial dis-
tinction would be harmful simply because it would add to the factual
issues in dispute.
The new implied warranty should include not only existing land
uses 148 but any other uses that the seller specifically identifies or
describes. The warranty, that is, should transform specific asser-
tions by the seller about the possible uses of the property into ex-
press warranties that such uses are lawful. An apartment building
owner who asserts that his building can be divided into twenty-three
efficiency apartments engages in more than puffing if zoning ordi-
nances limit the building to ten units. 149 A mobile home park seller
acts wrongfully if he asserts that the park can accept thirty trailers
and county regulations specify a maximum density of fifteen trail-
ers. 150 These seller assertions, if specific in form, should become
contractual specifications detailing the quality or characteristics of
the property and sfiould give rise to liability under the new warranty
148 A further issue concerning the scope of the warranty will be whether the war-
ranty is violated if the current land use is lawful but the usage is a nonconforming use
under zoning ordinances that may prohibit alterations, expansions, and perhaps even
major repairs. This issue may require a case-by-case examination, but any nonconform-
ing status appreciably and adversely affecting the property's value should violate the
warranty. A seller should be aware that his property is a nonconforming use and,
through the operation of the warranty, should be obligated to make an appropriate dis-
closure. Of course, if no disclosure is made but the buyer nonetheless learns of the
status, the buyer presumably will pay only the true market value of the property and
therefore will suffer no compensable loss.
149 See Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1089, 1092-93
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (relief denied because of purchaser's lack of diligence in iden-
tifying illegality and in seeking relief).
150 See Sawyer v. Pierce, 580 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See also Niehaus v.
Haven Park West, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 24, 440 N.E.2d 584 (1981) (misrepresentation
that mobile home park will accept 112 units).
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if the property fails to conform. This approach, long accepted in the
sale of personal property,15 ' is equally compelling in the context of
real property sales.
In addition to determining how to apply the implied warranty
to commercial property and buyers, courts will face a second issue:
whether and how the parties by agreement can alter the warranty's
terms. In resolving this issue, courts should consider the reasons
for the warranty and the nature of the real estate market. The pri-
mary purpose of the implied warranty is to induce sellers to discover
and disclose land use violations, thereby avoiding buyer-seller dis-
putes. 152 Once disclosure is adequately made, buyers should be
able to protect themselves and will not be forced to accept substan-
dard property. Real estate markets are characterized by numerous
buyers and sellers with no single seller possessing inordinate market
leverage. More importantly, nearly all properties for sale at any
time are likely to comply with land use restraints. Thus, buyers
should be able to locate another seller and another property when a
land use violation renders a property unacceptable.
These considerations suggest that courts should permit the
buyer and seller to modify the implied warranty when both know of
an existing violation and can appreciate its significance. Full disclo-
sure of violations, therefore, should be allowed in lieu of the war-
ranty. This conclusion does not imply, however, that a seller should
be able without full disclosure to exclude the warranty, either by
using a blanket exclusion or by way of language that excludes any
inconsistency between existing uses and restrictions contained in
the property's recorded chain of title. x53 The buyers most in need
151 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
The warranty is principally aimed-although not entirely-at ensuring fairness in
dealings between buyers and sellers rather than at larger public concerns such as health
and public welfare or the quality of the nation's housing stock. Compare Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases, based on concerns over quality of housing,
is not subject to waiver or exclusion).
153 Several courts have concluded that an "as is" clause or other general disclaimer
in a contract for the purchase of a new residence is not adequate to waive or exclude the
implied warranty of habitability. E.g., Davies v. Bradley, 676 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983) ("as is" clause meant that defendant was relieved of obligation to perform
further work but was still responsible for quality of work already completed); Briarcliffe
West Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. WisemaD Constr. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 402, 409, 480
N.E.2d 833, 839 (1985) (express disclaimer of warranties without specific reference to
habitability is insufficient; language of disclaimer must "be so clear and so conspicuous
that no other reasonable conclusion could be reached but that the buyers read and un-
derstood the language"); Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 806-07, 443
N.E.2d 36, 41 (1982) ("as is" language ineffective because agreement containing it did
not refer to any particular implied warranty but to implied warranties in general); Sal-
linger v. Mayer, 304 So. 2d 730, 732 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (waiver of implied warranty
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of warranty protection are those who lack adequate counsel. These
buyers will likely execute printed purchase contracts containing
terms that they do not fully understand. Such form contracts might
well come to include blanket exclusions of the lawful use warranty.
Moreover, a seller aware that his property materially violates land
use restraints might be tempted to include a warranty exclusion, ob-
viating the need to disclose the violation. Both practices would
largely subvert the purpose of disclosing land use violations. In-
deed, there are no circumstances providing a seller with legitimate
grounds for excluding the warranty without a fair disclosure when
he knows of existing violations.
Arguably, courts might permit warranty exclusions without dis-
closure when neither party knows whether land use violations exist.
Perhaps, as a matter of freedom of contract, the parties should be
free to shift from seller to buyer the duty to inquire and the risk of
unknown violations. When the buyer is knowledgeable and capable,
such a shift might seem reasonable. Nevertheless, allowing a war-
ranty exclusion when both buyer and seller are ignorant of any vio-
lations may result in other, undesirable instances of exclusion. By
allowing any warranty exclusion without full disclosure, courts run
substantial risks of denying the warranty's protections to buyers less
knowledgeable and capable. Moreover, the burdens of inquiry and
disclosure are slight and should not unduly burden sellers. On bal-
ance, the hazards of allowing warranty exclusions without full dis-
closure outweigh the slight benefits of contractual freedom that
against hidden defects must be clear and unambiguous, and evidence at trial must show
that waiver was brought to buyer's attention or explained to him). See M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 3, § 1.2(n), at 53-54. But see Schlanger v. Argo Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 864, 866,
335 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (1972) (contract clause, containing "as is" language, sufficient to
relieve seller of obligation to repair); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393
(Tex. 1982) (language waiving warranty must be "clear and free from doubt" but con-
tract language-" 'no . . . warranties, express or implied, in addition to said written
instruments' "--sufficient to waive implied warranty). General disclaimers and other
general contract clauses have not been sufficient to protect sellers against liability for
misrepresentations as to zoning status. See Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 544 P.2d
694 (1976) (clause saying that property taken subject to all existing ordinances); Zucker-
man-Vernon Corp. v. Rosen, 361 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (general exculpa-
tory clause); Fox v. Southern Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 141 S.E.2d 522 (1965)
(clause providing that property taken subject to restrictions of record; misrepresentation
as to absence of restrictive covenants). See also Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729,
742, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 209 (1963) ("as is" clause does not remove seller's obligation to
disclose that property is being condemned). But see, e.g., Lenawee County Bd. of Health
v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982) ("as is" clause renders purchaser
unable to obtain rescission for mutual mistake as to defective sewage system that ren-
dered property uninhabitable under county sanitation code because clause allocated risk
of loss to purchaser); Wilkinson v. Carpenter, 276 Or. 311, 314, 554 P.2d 512, 514
(1976) (disclaimer clause undercuts buyer's misrepresentation action in absence of
seller fraud).
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such exclusions would generate. 154
B. Damage Calculations and the Role of Materiality
and Scienter
Damage calculation issues will also arise under the new implied
warranty of lawful use. In actions for breach of the warranty, courts
should typically award money damages based on the difference be-
tween the property's market value with the violation and the
purchase price. This net amount will normally achieve the goal of
contract damages of placing the aggrieved party in the same eco-
nomic position he would have been in had no breach occurred. 15
5
This method of damage calculation best reconciles the competing
interests of buyers and sellers. Moreover, the remedy would elimi-
nate two issues that might otherwise cause trouble-the materiality
of the illegal land use and the extent of the purchaser's knowledge
of the illegal use at the time of contracting.
In calculating damages for breach of the warranty, courts
should compensate buyers for actual economic losses. Thus, injured
buyers should not automatically receive damages equal to the costs
of altering the purchased premises to bring them into compliance
with land use restraints. Even costs actually incurred should not be
received as a matter of course. 156 For example, a purchaser of a
154 One related issue is whether a warranty exclusion must be in writing. An oral
disclosure should suffice, although the cautious seller will employ a writing. An addi-
tional issue is whether a disclosure is adequate if it identifies a land use practice or con-
dition as a possible violation. Such a disclosure, if made in reference to a fairly specific
condition or practice, should suffice. Thus, a disclosure by a seller should be adequate if
it states that the legality of a particular practice is either unknown to the seller or in
doubt. Of course, a seller who expressly disclaims knowledge as to the legality of a
practice may be liable in misrepresentation if in fact he knows that the activity is
unlawful.
155 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4, at 521 (2d ed.
1977); Carroll, A Little Essay in Partial Defense of the Contract-Market Diferential as a Remedy
for Buyers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 667 (1984). Two recent decisions that follow this approach
and compare it to alternative approaches are Loeb Enter. v. Dotsen, 360 N.W.2d 371
(Minn. App. 1985) (misrepresentation as to age of roof; court concludes award of cost of
roof replacement would overcompensate plaintiff), and Correa v. Maggiore, 196 N.J.
Super. 273, 682 A.2d 192, 197-98 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (discussing unfair-
ness of awarding repair costs in many cases).
156 Under the UCC and traditional warranty damage rules, injured parties can re-
cover the difference between the value of the goods as they exist and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1977);J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, supra note 155, at 549-5 1. In determining the value of goods as warranted, an
objective market value standard is used. Id. at 550. This measure of damages entails
greater liability if the buyer can prove that the contract price was less than the market
price at the time of the seller's breach. This element of damage recovery can be ignored
when, as will almost always be the case, the buyer keeps the substandard property and
does not purchase substitute property. Even when the buyer purchases substitute prop-
erty, this element is unduly speculative and should therefore be ignored. The only relia-
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building with substandard wiring should not routinely receive the
full costs of bringing the wiring into code compliance. If the buyer
rewires the building, his action may increase its value above the
amount paid for it; the buyer should not recover this excess. Only
in the instance when the buyer's true economic loss equals the
cost of rewiring should a court grant such relief. If the buyer does
not rewire, the market value differential provides adequate
compensation.
Contract rules requiring buyers to mitigate damages should fur-
ther limit recovery.1 57 Absent fraud by the seller, buyers of prop-
erty should be obligated to take whatever action seems likely to
reduce their losses. Such efforts could include seeking zoning vari-
ances or renegotiating private restraints or restrictive covenants. A
buyer's duty to mitigate is appropriate when losses are economic in
nature and do not stem from the seller's culpable behavior.
Similarly, foreseeability rules should limit the recovery of con-
sequential damages because innocent sellers should not be obli-
gated to take their plaintiffs as they find them. 158 A minor zoning
violation, such as the unlawful erection of a front yard fence, should
make the seller liable for the cost of removing the fence and any
decline in the property's value from what the purchaser paid. If the
purchaser for personal reasons finds the lack of a fence unaccept-
able and incurs expenses in reselling and moving to a new location,
the seller should not be liable unless the buyer's response was fore-
seeable. A buyer who is exceptionally interested in a particular land
use should inform the seller of that interest. A limit to damages
based on foreseeability in some instances will raise contested factual
issues and will thus reduce some of the warranty's simplicity. Such a
limitation on the buyer's recovery, however, is fair to both sides.
Moreover, this limitation helps justify the shifting of buyer eco-
nomic losses to unknowing and essentially innocent sellers.
Application of these contract damage rules will eliminate the
troublesome question of the materiality of land use violations from a
buyer's cause of action. When a land use violation is immaterial in
either its market value impact or its effect on the buyer's pricing
decision, the buyer will suffer little economic loss under these rules.
When this is the case, a court should simply award little damage
relief; it need not deny relief entirely just because the buyer's loss is
ble measure of a parcel's value is the price it brings when offered for sale because real
property parcels are not fungible. When dealing with unique goods in local markets, a
buyer should not be permitted to contend that the price he agreed to was less than the
market price.
157 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 155, §§ 14-15 to -17, at 538-43 (discuss-
ing, inter alia, duty to mitigate damages upon breach of contract).
158 Id. §§14-5 to -7, at 522-28.
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slight. The lack of any need for a materiality requirement can be
illustrated by the case of a hypothetical seller who visibly keeps
three dogs in his home. Under the proposed warranty, the seller
implicitly warrants that the buyer can lawfully keep three dogs there.
If zoning ordinances limit the homeowner to two animals, the seller
has breached the warranty. The seller's minor breach, however,
would give rise to only slight damages, if any, under a market value
differential theory of damage calculation. Under traditional tort
remedies, by contrast, this seller could face substantial liability if the
buyer for peculiar reasons decided to resell the property and move.
In misrepresentation law the materiality requirement and other ele-
ments can protect the seller from this unexpected and unfair liabil-
ity. Under the implied warranty, the foreseeability requirement can
adequately provide this protection. In this case and others, a fore-
seeability requirement for consequential damages and mitigation
rules can adequately and fairly limit liability without need for an ad-
ditional requirement of materiality. 59
These limits on buyer recovery should also eliminate buyer
knowledge as an issue in actions for breach of warranty. In misrep-
resentation actions, a buyer who knows or should know of the falsity
of the seller's representation is barred from recovery.1 60 This limi-
tation invites dispute over the level of the buyer's knowledge. When
damage recovery is limited in the proposed manner, the buyer's
knowledge becomes irrelevant.' 6 ' A buyer who knows of land use
violations when purchasing is unlikely to pay more for the property
than its fair market value with the violation. In such an instance, the
buyer has no damages based on the ordinary market-value differen-
tial rules. A knowing buyer is also unlikely to incur consequential
damages. Even if such damages are foreseeable and thus recover-
159 Materiality will remain important, however, in deciding whether a buyer can re-
scind the transaction. Rescission normally should only be allowed when justice cannot
otherwise be achieved. If the buyer can resell the property, he should be obligated to do
so and then seek damages for his loss. If resale is not feasible, however, rescission may
be appropriate. For example, when an illegality is so substantial that a buyer would
incur sizeable expenditures in bringing the property into conformity for resale, a court
should grant the buyer's request for rescission. Rescission under this standard may be
appropriate after the sale closing as well as before, even though courts have traditionally
been reluctant to grant rescission after closing as a remedy for breach of title covenants.
THE LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, 810-11. Rescission might be more generously
allowed before the sale closing.
160 E.g., Rowntree v. Rice, 426 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) ("plaintiff in a
fraud suit must plead and prove on the merits that he was ignorant of the falsity of the
defendant's representations").
161 A buyer's knowledge is irrelevant in actions for the breach of title covenants.
E.g., Eames v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
("Grantee's actual or constructive knowledge of title defects does not relieve grantor of
warranty obligations.") (citation omitted).
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able, the buyer is only restored to his pre-purchase position and
therefore has no motivation to incur the injuries in the first instance.
The more difficult case in assessing the relevance of buyer sci-
enter is presented by the buyer who negligently fails to discover an
illegality and consequently pays an excessive purchase price. Tradi-
tional tort law would deny recovery in such a case;' 62 the implied
warranty of lawful use, by contrast, would provide relief. A negli-
gent purchaser may deserve little sympathy, but contract relief com-
pensates the purchaser only by taking from the seller the premium
that the purchaser pays out of ignorance. The seller does not de-
serve to keep this premium, and restitution for the buyer therefore
seems reasonably fair.' 63 The deletion of any reference to buyer
knowledge or negligence, in short, has no substantial drawbacks.
Moreover, it does achieve positive benefits: It encourages seller dis-
closures by eliminating all the benefits of nondisclosure, and it with-
draws a major issue of possible factual dispute. 164
These various limits on the buyer's recovery may appear parsi-
monious and overly solicitous of the seller's interests when a seller
has engaged in deceitful conduct. For example, when a seller has
intentionally deceived a buyer about compliance with an electrical
wiring code, elementary fairness might seem to require that the
seller pay for rewiring even if the buyer receives a structure worth
more than he paid. This sense of fairness stems, of course, from the
wrongfulness of the seller conduct. Such wrongful conduct by sell-
ers might justify punitive damages, 165 which contract rules do not
162 See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 84.
When a seller who is negligent in failing to identify an illegality seeks consequential
damages as well as recovery of the purchase price - market value differential, the balanc-
ing of competing equities becomes more difficult. The issue should be addressed as a
question of the adequacy of the buyer's efforts at mitigation. If the buyer could have
avoided his loss through reasonable efforts at mitigation and negligently failed to do so,
the loss capable of mitigation should not be compensated. A buyer should be held neg-
ligent, however, only if he had clear notice of problems and failed to respond reason-
ably. Broader inquiry duties should not be imposed.
164 A buyer's negligence may be relevant to an inquiry into the determination of
damages in some circumstances. Ifa buyer ignores obvious evidence of unlawful use, he
arguably considered the issue irrelevant in setting the purchase price and therefore suf-
fered no loss from the illegality. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. This circum-
stance might arise, for example, if the buyer intends to discontinue the use. The issue
might be relevant in calculating what, if any, damages the buyer sustained. Moreover,
where the buyer is on notice of a possible illegality by reason of an express statement by
the seller that a particular land use is in doubt, the seller may have made an adequate
disclosure. See supra note 154.
165 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1982)
(recovery of punitive damages and damages for severe emotional distress); Walker v.
Signal Cos., 149 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978) (punitive damages); Millikin v. Green, 283 Or.
283, 583 P.2d 548 (1978) (punitive damages); Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175,
368 N.W.2d 676 (1985) (punitive damages). For a recent judicial discussion of the avail-
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provide. 166 To fill this need, courts can and should apply the tort
law of misrepresentation as an alternative form of relief in such in-
stances. In this limited role, however, the law of misrepresentation
should be retained in a form that preserves its traditional focus on
actual deception by sellers.
167
C. Breach and Recovery
A final issue that courts will face in defining the new implied
warranty is when and how the warranty is breached and who can sue
for relief. Courts developing other warranties have confronted simi-
lar issues. For example, courts expounding the implied warranty of
habitability have chosen a statute of limitations, decided when the
statute begins to run, and determined whether subsequent purchas-
ers can sue on the original warranty. 168 This section addresses this
issue. It considers as well the related question of whether a war-
ranty beneficiary should receive damage relief in the absence of
some effort by a third party to halt the illegal property use.
These issues are not subject to a facile resolution. This section
proposes a resolution to them, however, that is relatively easy to
apply and that respects the competing interests of buyers and sellers
of property. The resolution proposed is framed with a view towards
ability of tort remedies for contract breaches, see Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 774-84, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 366-73, 686 P.2d 1158,
1170-77 (1984) (Bird, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
166 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 155, § 14-3, at 520 ("Traditionally...
punitive damages are not awarded in contract actions, no matter how malicious the
breach.") (citations omitted).
167 When misrepresentation law is used simply to supplement the implied warranty,
courts should retain some of the traditional misrepresentation elements with their focus
on the seller's fault. Courts should impose tort liability only for an express seller repre-
sentation-as opposed to a representation implied from the showing of the property-
and should require some demonstration of the seller's scienter and perhaps actual reli-
ance by the buyer. The traditional law-fact distinction and inquiry duties that are placed
on buyers should not be retained even after creation of an implied warranty. Many in-
jured buyers, of course, will seek relief under both warranty and misrepresentation theo-
ries. In some individual cases the request for relief based on the two claims might
eliminate the simplicity benefits achieved by a warranty-based cause of action. Clear
warranty liability, however, should encourage sellers to settle, thereby leading to the
resolution of most disputes. A separate finding of tort liability will be helpful only to a
buyer who has incurred unforeseeable consequential damages or who possesses a legiti-
mate claim for punitive damages. These cases should be few in number.
168 See Mallor, supra note 13, at 366-75 (discussing cases extending and refusing to
extend protection to subsequent purchasers); Note, supra note 13, at 479-501 (examin-
ing possible defenses to implied warranty claims, including whether warranty has ex-
pired); Note, Builders' Liability for Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REV. 607, 610-
21 (1980) (discussing subsequent purchasers' common law and statutory remedies);
Comment, Liability of the Builder-Vendor Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability-Where
Does It End?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 593, 599-602 (1979) (discussing court decisions
fixing limitations periods and establishing rules for determining when applicable period
begins to run).
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the underlying purposes of the warranty. One key aim of the war-
ranty is to protect a buyer's legitimate assumption that a land use is
lawful and to eliminate the need to make inquiries on the subject.
This assumption merits some form of long-term protection since a
buyer may use his lands for many years before a third party enforcer
disrupts his possession. The seller's interests, on the other hand, are
best served by a limited and definite limitations period and clear
limits on his potential liability for avoidable losses.
Title warranty rules suggest a resolution of these competing in-
terests. Title warranties or covenants are of two types: those
breached, if at all, upon conveyance and those breached upon an
"ouster" of the warranty beneficiary. 169 For this latter type of war-
ranty, the limitations period begins at the time of ouster.170 Warran-
ties of this type run with the land-at least prior to an ouster-and
former owners cannot enforce them.' 71 The limitations period for
the former type of warranty begins to run from the date of convey-
ance;' 72 these warranties do not run with the land, although subse-
quent purchasers may have rights to bring actions for their
breach. 1
73
An analgous bifurcation of the warranty of lawful use would
reconcile the competing interests of buyers and sellers without ex-
cessive complication. Courts can tailor the warranty to provide for
two distinct forms of breach. Each type of breach would give rise to
a separate action subject to a distinct limitations period. A breach
occurring upon initial conveyance would entitle the purchaser to re-
cover damages based on the diminished market value of the prop-
erty. No third-party disturbance or ouster would be required for
this sort of claim. The limitations period for such a breach should
parallel the normal contract breach period and would begin to run
upon conveyance without regard to the buyer's knowledge or dis-
covery. This aspect of the warranty would not run with the land, but
the right to seek relief would run to subsequent purchasers absent
an express provision in the subsequent purchase agreement reserv-
ing the right of relief to the seller. 174 A second, alternate action
169 The covenants breached, if at all, upon conveyance are the covenants of seisen,
right to convey, and freedom from encumbrances. The covenants that are breached
only upon ouster or eviction are the covenants of quiet enjoyment, warranty, and further
assurances. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 10, § 11.13.
170 Id. at 815.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 814.
173 Id. at 814-15. A subsequent purchaser may have a cause of action if a court con-
strues a subsequent grantee's deed as containing an implied assignment of a cause of
action arising from the breach of a covenant made to a prior grantee. Id.
174 See, e.g., Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 NJ. 92, 99-100, 484 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1984)
(when contract contains no prohibition on assignment, contractor's implied warranty of
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would require that the buyer show an enforcement or "ouster" and
would be subject to a limitation period beginning at that time. The
latter aspect of the warranty would run with the land, passing auto-
matically to subsequent takers of the property.
A warranty of lawful use, structured in this fashion, respects the
interests of buyers and sellers.' 75 A buyer who acts promptly will
recover market value losses without having to prove that he was
ousted. If the limitations period has run and no ouster has oc-
curred, the buyer cannot recover. But enforcement in such a case is
unlikely and the buyer's loss speculative. Furthermore, if ouster
does occur later, the buyer is still protected. In practice the war-
ranty will offer some protection to the buyer who learns of the ille-
galities after the initial limitations period but before any third party
enforcement, as might happen, for example, when the buyer seeks
to resell and undertakes his own inquiries that turn up illegalities.
The warranty does not provide a buyer with a cause of action in such
an instance, but the buyer has some bargaining leverage to negoti-
ate for some relief from the initial seller. The buyer can negotiate
by offering the seller the opportunity to end exposure to the seller's
potential indefinite liability as an inducement to settle.
Under the warranty the seller's possible liability does extend in
time almost without limit. Such exposure, however, does not differ
from a seller's possible liability under certain covenants of title.
Moreover, both the prospect of liability and the amount of any ac-
tual liability are likely to diminish substantially after the initial limi-
tation period. Thereafter, the seller will be liable only upon third
party enforcement. If enforcement of the restraint is unlikely, the
seller's risk of loss will be low and the buyer's negotiating strength
slight. The seller might still desire to end all doubt, but the settle-
ment amount will presumably decline with the reduced risk of
enforcement.
good workmanship is automatically assigned as contract right to subsequent
purchasers).
175 By comparison, a large number of courts have concluded that the implied war-
ranty of habitability extends for a reasonable period of time and that subsequent pur-
chasers during that period enjoy the benefits of the warranty, even though they are not
in privity with the builder or contractor. See, e.g., Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185,
612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324
(1982); Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Hermes v. Stai-
ano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla.
1981); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979). But see, e.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30
Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972); Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n v. Hill
Dev. Corp., 36 Conn. Supp. 144, 414 A.2d 1177 (1980); Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Develop-
ment Concepts Corp., 373 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Oates v.JAG, Inc., 66
N.C. App. 244, 311 S.E.2d 369 (1984), rev'd, 333 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1985).
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CONCLUSION
In numerous decisions over the past decade, state courts across
the country have sympathized with the plight of the unknowing
buyer of property that violates some land use restraint. They have
eroded, unevenly but steadily, several of the traditional barriers to
the recovery by buyers of damages under the tort of misrepresenta-
tion. Nearly all states have accepted one or another of several major
alterations of established misrepresentation doctrine. In the few
states that appear to have accepted them all, courts have altered dra-
matically the face and aim of the misrepresentation action. They
have imposed liability on sellers, not based on blameworthy, mis-
leading conduct, but simply because the seller has sold property
that cannot lawfully be used for its obvious, intended purpose and
that therefore fails to satisfy the normal, reasonable expectations of
buyers. They have, in effect, come very close to creating in normal
real estate contracts an implied seller warranty that existing prop-
erty uses comply with applicable land use restraints.
Other judicial and legislative developments reflect this same
growing concern for the plight of the unknowing buyer. Several
courts have broadened seller disclosure duties so as to require sell-
ers to speak in the face of material violations. State consumer fraud
stafutes have been construed to impose similar disclosure duties
and to create misrepresentation-like damage actions that remove
some of the major impediments to buyer relief. Courts have further
shown their concern by expanding the availability of restitution and
rescission.
The traditional common law rule of caveat emptor has become
anachronistic. It requires buyers to detect land use violations when
this often-difficult investigative task is better imposed on real estate
sellers. Sellers are better situated to know of violations or detect
them and have more time to do so; sellers are generally better ad-
vised of their legal duties and, as a result, are more likely to fulfill
them. For reasons of practicality and fairness, the law should re-
quire sellers to detect and disclose to buyers any existing land use
violations and should hold sellers liable if they misstate the permis-
sible uses of property offered for sale.
The tort rules on misrepresentation, however, as well as the
other remedial actions used by courts to give relief to buyers, are ill-
suited for this task. A better way to impose this inquiry and disclo-
sure duty on sellers and to protect the reasonable expectations of
buyers is to create an implicit warranty that existing uses of the
property, and other property uses described by the seller, are con-
sistent with applicable land use restraints.
This new warranty would operate much like current title cove-
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nants and warranties of habitability. In designing the warranty,
courts should apply it to all types of real estate sales, not just to sales
of residential property. They should allow contracting parties to al-
ter the warranty, but only by way of disclosures by sellers of particu-
lar land use violations and not through the use of blanket waiver
clauses. They should not require a buyer to prove that he has been
disturbed in his possession by reason of the land use violation un-
less the normal contract statute of limitations has expired and dis-
turbance or ouster seems unlikely. Finally, courts designing the new
warranty should normally limit damage recovery to the difference
between the amount paid by the purchaser and the market value of
the property as it exists, allowing additional damages only if foresee-
able and not capable of mitigation.
Courts years ago began creating warranties applicable to per-
sonal property sales to bring the law into conformity with shared
values and expectations. The same process-begun with the now
firmly entrenched and highly regarded warranty of habitability-
should be undertaken in the setting of real estate sales. The judicial
development today of an implied seller warranty of lawful use, an
appropriate and needed step, would eliminate many harsh applica-
tions of the caveat emptor doctrine and would align the centuries-
old law of real estate sales with contemporary public expectations.
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